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ARTICLE
Michael Ariens
The Agony of Modern Legal Ethics, 1970-1985
Abstract. When the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted its Code
of Professional Responsibility at its annual meeting in August 1969, the
American legal profession was a publicly respected and economically
vibrant body. Lawyers, though always more feared than loved, became
increasingly important in post-World War II America. The demand for
their services exploded for a quarter-century, and lawyers assumed an
increased role in the economic and political life of the United States.
During the 1950s and early 1960s, the Cold War led American lawyers
and other public figures to re-emphasize the rule of law as defining the
difference between the United States and the Soviet Union. Relatedly,
American lawyers argued they possessed a central role in maintaining the
rule of law. From the 1950s through the mid-1960s, the popular image of
lawyers may have peaked. It was at this time that the ABA began its work
to update the 1908 Canons of Ethics. The ABA's adoption of the Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1969 was the first significant reformulation
of a lawyer's code of ethics, and was intended to demonstrate that lawyers
deserved the trust placed in them by American society. The ABA's
adoption of the Code, and its quick acceptance by most states as law, were
the last acts in a "golden age."
By 1974, the American legal profession was reeling from the turmoil of
the late 1960s, followed by the Watergate affair and an economic
downturn that adversely affected many lawyers. The larger legal profession
was buffeted by a series of lawsuits alleging antitrust violations by the ABA
and state bar organizations, and the Supreme Court held in 1977 that a
ban on lawyer advertising for ethical reasons was unconstitutional.
Although some lawyers did exceedingly well economically during the
1970s, many struggled. In late 1977, the President of the ABA called for
the Code's replacement. Shortly thereafter, the ABA's House of Delegates
approved the nomination of the members of the Kutak Commission,
which was handed this task. During the half-decade effort to craft the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the problematic ethical behavior of
lawyers continued to make national news. Within the profession, a
significant segment of the Bar rejected the structure and tenets of the
Code, demanding a "modern" code of legal ethics befitting the needs of
modern lawyers. Another segment of the lawyer population challenged the
particular vision within the Code of the ethical duties of lawyers in
representing clients. When the ABA adopted its Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, it replaced a code that combined rules and
aspirations with an approach that merely set a floor regarding lawyer
conduct. The drafters of the Model Rules intentionally created a law of
lawyering that supplanted an ethic of lawyering. Much more so than the
Code, the Model Rules ushered in the modern understanding of lawyer
ethics.
This Article examines a crucial period in the history of American legal
ethics, 1970-1985. Its thesis is that a shallow, though broad, consensus
among American lawyers concerning the ideals of legal professionalism
dissolved during the 1970s. An ideological dissensus, propelled by the
scandalous behavior of some Executive Branch lawyers in the Watergate
affair, joined by a heightened fear of economic torpor, shattered the post-
World War II profession's accepted self-definition.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct implicitly acknowledged this
ideological disagreement, a disagreement that has coursed through the
history of the American legal profession from the late 1970s to the present.
Author. Professor, St. Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio,
Texas. Thanks to Vicki Mather, David Papke, and Rick Sander for their
comments and suggestions. Thanks also to my research assistants,
Brendan Villanueva-Le, Stephanie Green, and Dorian Ojemen for their
help; and my deep thanks to Stacy Fowler of the Sarita Kenedy East Law
Library at St. Mary's University, whose help with some obscure and
unusual sources made this Article possible.
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The Agony of Modern Legal Ethics
I. INTRODUCTION
The House of Delegates of the American Bar Association (ABA)
adopted the proposed Code of Professional Responsibility on August 12,
1969, without any recorded dissent and without amendment.' The ABA
then created the Special Committee to Secure Adoption of the Code of
Professional Responsibility to promote the Code's adoption as law in the
states.2 In its semi-annual reports beginning in February 1970, the Special
Committee listed an ever-increasing number of states that had adopted the
Code as law. Sixteen states, twelve state bar associations, and the District
of Columbia Bar adopted the Code by summer 1970,' and thirty-one
states, eleven state bar associations, and the District of Columbia Bar had
adopted it a year later.4 The Special Committee regularly noted that most
states had approved and adopted the Code without revision.5 And of
those states that amended the Code, the Special Committee reported that
none made any "fundamental" changes. 6  Within three years of its
adoption by the ABA, forty-three states and the District of Columbia had
adopted the Code as law, and an additional four state bar associations had
adopted the Code as applicable to their members, though not law.7 Just
three states-Alabama, California, and North Carolina-had not taken
1. See Proceedings of the 1969 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 94 A.B.A. ANN. REP.
378, 389-92 (1969) (adopting the Code). One amendment was proposed, but failed. See id. at
391-92 (discussing the proposed McCalpin amendment). After the ABA adopted the Code, the
Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, which drafted it, proposed two very modest
amendments, which the ABA House of Delegates adopted at its February 1970 Midyear Meeting.
See Proceedings of the 1970 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 95 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 123, 145-
46 (1970) (adopting a new subsection to the definitions section of the Code, and amending DR
2-105(A)(1) as it relates to practicing patent law in the United States).
2. See Proceedings of the 1970 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 95 A.B.A. ANN. REP.
536, 550 (1970) (stating the Special Committee's goal of "securing adoption or approval of the Code
in all states").
3. See Report of Special Committee to Secure Adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 95
A.B.A. ANN. REP. 770, 770 (1970) (reviewing the various states in which the Code had been adopted
or approved and recommended for adoption).
4. See id., 96 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 676, 676 (1971) (reporting how many states and bar
associations had adopted the Code by 1971).
5. Id, 95 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 770, 770 (1970); see also id., 96 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 243, 243
(1971) (restating that in most states, the Code had been adopted without change); id, 96 A.B.A.
ANN. REP. 676, 676 (1971) (listing states which had adopted the Code as the standard for ethical
conduct).
6. See id., 95 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 770, 770 (1970) (stressing that no fundamental changes had
been made by the adopting states); id., 96 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 243, 243 (1971) (emphasizing that
amendments did not fundamentally change the Code).
7. Id, 97 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 740, 741 (1972).
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any "official action" concerning the Code.8
In his August 1972 report, Chairman Earl F. Morris reported the
Special Committee was "to be discontinued."9 This decision was made
because its members maintained the "expectation that most of those
jurisdictions that ha[d] not yet completed the adoption process w[ould] do
so within the next several months." 10
One example of this consensus concerning the Code is found in the
adoption process undertaken in Texas. In 1969, the State Bar of Texas
formed a Special Committee on Revision of the Texas Canons of Ethics.
The Special Committee amended just six rules found in the ABA's Code
(all based on long-standing practices in Texas). 1 The State Bar's Board of
Directors approved the Code, and, as required by law, sent the proposed
Code to the members of the State Bar for a vote in fall 1971. Texas
lawyers "overwhelmingly approved" the adoption of the Code, 12 and the
Texas Supreme Court quickly issued an order adopting the Code.
This nearly universal acceptance of the Code unraveled almost as
quickly as it arrived. In August 1977, the ABA created a special committee
to investigate "all facets of legal ethics." 13 As made clear by the title of his
article, The Legal Profession Needs a New Code of Ethics,14 ABA President
William Spann, Jr. hoped the committee would supplant the Code, rather
than amend it. The ABA replaced the Code with its Model Rules of
Professional Conduct in 1983, but only after much rancor and division. 1 5
The ABA's House of Delegates met at its February 1983 Midyear Meeting
to discuss approval of the proposed Model Code. Over the course of two
days, it managed to work through just twenty-nine of more than 200
proposed amendments. 16 Even after the ABA's House of Delegates
8. Id; see also id. at 741-44 (summarizing action regarding the Code in each state).
9. Id. at 741.
10. Id.
11. See Cullen Smith, The New Code of Professional Responsibility for Texas Lawyers-A Step
Forward, 34 TEX. B.J. 749, 749-51 (1971) (reviewing the amended changes pending their
submission to State Bar members by written ballot).
12. See Members Vote for Bar Rule Changes, 34 TEX. B.J. 1052, 1052 (1971) (announcing
approval of the submitted amendments to the Texas State Bar Rules).
13. William B. Spann, Jr., The Legal Profession Needs a New Code of Ethics, B. LEADER, Nov.-
Dec. 1977, at 2, 3.
14. Id.
15. See Gerard J. Clark, Commentary, Fear and Loathing in New Orleans: The Sorry Fate of the
Kutak Commission's Rules, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 79, 79-91 (1983) (discussing the debate among
the ABA to revise the Code); Ted Schneyer, Professionalism As Bar Politics: The Making of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677, 678 (1989) (describing the production
of and debate surrounding the Model Rules).
16. Gerard J. Clark, Commentary, Fear and Loathing in New Orleans: The Sorry Fate of the
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adopted the Model Code at its August 1983 Annual Meeting, 17 states'
acceptance came much slower than was the case regarding the Code. It
took five years for half of the states to adopt some version of the Model
Rules,' 8 and each freely amended it.' 9
Why did the American legal profession turn so quickly on the Code
after so fully embracing it? This Article argues that the Code of
Professional Responsibility was the last act in a "golden age" for American
lawyers. Tensions from within and outside the legal profession prefigured
the end of the golden age as early as 1966 and 1967. Those tensions
increased through the end of the 1960s and into the 1970s, and the
pervasive involvement of lawyers in the Watergate scandal was one strong
sign the American legal profession had entered a new era. Watergate
exacerbated an already existing crisis of public confidence regarding
lawyers. This loss of public confidence was joined by a generalized fear
within the legal profession of economic decline. These events negatively
affected the public standing and role of lawyers. A loss of public
confidence was a crisis of standing, for the public's mistrust of lawyers
lessened the authority of lawyers to act as a mediating body between
citizens and the state, a standing that allowed both lawyers and the public
to distinguish between professionalism (good) and commercialism (bad).20
The economic crisis lawyers faced was perceived as a crisis of status.
Lawyers feared a return to a more precarious financial condition of earlier
decades. Most importantly, these changes chipped away at the professional
standing of lawyers with the public.
One solution to these crises was to scrap the Code and replace it with
what became the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The history of
drafting and adopting the Model Rules demonstrates the institutional
acknowledgment that the American legal profession was in fact a grouping
of a number of subsets of lawyers, subsets that possessed very different
Kutak Commission's Rules, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 79, 85 (1983).
17. Proceedings of the 1983 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 108 A.B.A. ANN. REP.
763, 764 (1983).
18. Informational Report of the Adjunct Committee on Implementation of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 113 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 64, 64 (1988).
19. See PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE AS THEY DO 109 (1998) (noting in 1998
that "a substantial majority of the states have adopted the Model Rules, invariably with certain
changes"); see also CHARLES F. HERRING, JR., TEXAS LEGAL MALPRACTICE & LAWYER DISCIPLINE
203 (2d ed. 1997) ("The Texas Rules depart in many important respects from the ABA Model
Rules.").
20. See John G. Hervey, The Decline of Professionalism in the Law: An Exploration into Some
Causes, 3 N.Y. L. FORUM 349, 349 (1957) ("[O]f all professions, the law should be the most
professional and it appears that the law has a tendency to become the least professional.").
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interests in the making of rules of ethics that governed lawyers' conduct.
This Article is divided into three parts. Part II discusses the golden age
of American lawyering, which extends from the late 1940s largely through
the adoption of the Code in 1969. Part III traces the history of the end of
the golden age, from the early discontentedness of some lawyers with the
legal system, joined by a similar discontent from some outside the legal
profession beginning in the late 1960s to the impact of Watergate on the
legal profession in the 1970s. Part IV discusses the turn from the Code
and the fight within the profession to craft the Model Rules. Part IV also
addresses the immediate reaction to internal claims that a significant
number of lawyers had abandoned professionalism for commercialism
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, a claim that has haunted the
American legal profession for the past three decades. Finally, Part V offers
a brief conclusion.
II. THE "GOLDEN AGE"
A. Lawyers in American Society and Culture, 1945-1969
There never was a legal "golden age."' 2 1  Few lawyers practicing law
from the end of World War II through the 196 0s perceived the American
legal profession had reached an apogee in terms of economic power, social
influence, and public respect. But lawyers who practiced law during this
era (1946-1970) did better economically and socially than lawyers of the
1930s or lawyers practicing in the '70s and '80s.
Much of the reason lawyers improved their economic situation was due
simply to the overall economic boom in the United States from 1946 to
1964.22 Richard Sander and E. Douglass Williams looked at lawyers'
incomes for the half-century between 1929 and 1979.23 Using constant
1983 dollars, the mean income of lawyers between 1929 and 1941 (the
Great Depression) was nearly identical. 24 In contrast, median lawyer
21. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 20 (1991) (indicating the "golden age" took place in
"the late 1950s and the early 1960s"); MARYANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How
THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 20 (1996)
(describing what was referred to as the "golden age" in the legal profession).
22. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 207 (1964) (noting in Table C-I an increase
in gross national product from $210.7 billion in 1946 to an estimated $585 billion in 1963).
23. See Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams, Why Are There So Many Lawyers?
Perspectives on a Turbulent Market, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 431, 448 (1989) (comparing lawyers'
incomes from 1929-1979).
24. Id. No data reflecting median income of lawyers was available for these listed years, or for
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income in 1969 ($47,638), also in constant 1983 dollars, was almost twice
as much as it was in 1947 ($25,415).25 Sander and Williams also
compared the ratio of lawyer median and mean earnings to median and
mean earnings of workers in the United States. Median lawyer income in
1947 was 1.86 times the median income of all workers in the United
States. 26 In 1969, median lawyer income was 1.85 times the median
income in the United States.2 7 Thus, lawyers received the same economic
premium compared with the median worker in both 1947 and 1969.
Because real income nearly doubled for all Americans during these two
decades, real lawyer income also nearly doubled. But even if lawyers' real
income simply matched real income increases in American society, other
evidence suggested a rising influence of lawyers in American society.28
The demand for legal services greatly outstripped supply during the
golden age. Demand for legal services increased by 86% in the 1940s and
by 76% in the 1950s, while supply grew by only 12% and 35%,
respectively. 2 9  A late 1970s study by economist B. Peter Pashigian
concluded that the 1960s was a decade of "general prosperity for the legal
profession." 3
Surveys taken by state bar associations suggested the elevated status of
lawyers in the 1960s. A 1963 survey of occupational status ranked lawyers
eleventh in the public's view.3 1  That same year, the Missouri Bar
published the results of a broad survey of the Missouri public and its
lawyers. 3 2 Public respondents to the Improvement of Legal Services
Questionnaire-including both those who had used legal services and
those who had never used legal services-were asked about the general
reputation of lawyers. Eighty-three percent responded that the reputation
of lawyers was very good (28%) or good (59%), while just 15% found that
reputation fair, and only 2% believed the reputation of lawyers was
poor.33 Respondents were also asked to estimate "[h]ow many lawyers
1935.
25. Id.
26. 1d. at 4 4 9.
27. Id.
28. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 160 (1989) (discussing the high demand for
legal services in post-war years).
29. Id.
30. B. Peter Pashigian, The Number and Earnings of Lauyers: Some Recent Findings, 1978 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 51, 73.
31. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 163 (1989).
32. MO. BAR PRENTICE HALL SURVEY, A MOTIVATIONAL STUDY OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES
AND LAW OFFICE MANAGEMENT (1963).
33. Id. at 22. Lawyers were also surveyed, and their response was nearly identical to the
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live[d] up to the Code of Ethics." 34 Sixty-eight percent concluded that
"most lawyers" did so, 23% responded "half of the lawyers," and just 9%
thought "few of the lawyers" abided by the Code of Ethics.3 5 Interviewers
asked both "non-users" and "users" about the general reputation of
lawyers, using the categories "Very good," "Good," "Average," "Poor," and
"Don't know." Eighty percent of non-users and users believed that
lawyers' collective reputation was average or better, though the two groups
differed slightly regarding the particular categorization.
A similar study taken for the State Bar of Texas in the early 1970s
indicated that 60% of the public had a favorable view of lawyers, and the
remaining 40% split evenly with either a "neutral" or unfavorable view,
including "Very Unfavorable" (9.6%) and "Mostly Unfavorable" (9%).37
Other cultural indicators may suggest the respect lawyers received from
the American public in the 1950s through the mid-1960s. In 1955, the
book Never Plead Guilty was published. 38 Never Plead Guilty was a breezy
story of the many (mostly criminal defense) cases of a San Francisco lawyer
named J. W. "Jake" Ehrlich.3 9 It was featured on the New York Times
Best Sellers list for eleven weeks, from September 11, 1955 to November
response of the public. Twenty-four percent of lawyers believed the general reputation of lawyers was
very good, 59% believed it was good, 14% thought it was fair, and 1% thought it was poor. Id. at
30.
34. Id. at 23.
35. Id, Lawyers also gave similar responses: 73% believed most lawyers lived up to the Code,
while a significantly smaller percentage believed that only half of lawyers (23%) or few lawyers (5%)
lived up to the Code. Id. at 31.
36. Id. at 37.
Non-users (%) Users (%)
Very Good 21.3 25.4
Good 50.7 40.2
Average 8 14.9
37. Bar Attitudinal Study Completed, Results Published for First Time, 34 TEX. B.J. 13, 14
(1971).
38. JOHN WESLEY NOBLE & BERNARD AVERBUCH, NEVER PLEAD GUILTY: THE STORY OF
JAKE EHRLICH (1955). The Art of Advocacy by Lloyd Paul Stryker, another criminal defense lawyer,
made the New York Times Best Sellers list the week of April 18, 1954. See New York Times Best
Sellers List, HAWES PUBL'NS, http://www.hawes.com/1954/1954-04-18.pdf (last visited Sept. 20,
2014) (ranking sixteenth). When Ehrlich's autobiography, A Life in My Hands, was published in
1965, it never made the New York Times Best Sellers list, which then was limited to the top ten best-
selling fiction and nonfiction books. JAKE EHRLICH, A LIFE IN MY HANDS (1965).
39. See Roger K. Newman, Ehrlich, Jacob W (lake), in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN LAW 183, 183 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009) (oudining the life and accomplishments of
defense attorney Jake Ehrlich); see also JAKE EHRLICH, A LIFE IN MY HANDS (1965) (recounting his
personal life as a criminal defense attorney).
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20, 1955,40 and reportedly sold 2-3 million copies." The public's
appetite for nonfiction books about law and lawyers then ratcheted
upward. In 1962, three such books made the New York Times Best Sellers
list. My Life in Court,42 written by Louis Nizer and published in late
1961, tells the story of Nizer's career as a New York City civil litigator. It
was on the New York Times Best Sellers list for an astonishing seventy-two
weeks, from December 3, 1961 through April 14, 1963.4 3 It topped the
list for nine of those weeks. In mid-1962, Doubleday, the publisher of
Nizer's book, released Final Verdict14 written by Adela Rogers St. Johns.
Final Verdict was a memoir of her life growing up in early twentieth
century Los Angeles with her father, Earl Rogers, a brilliant and dissolute
criminal defense lawyer.4 5  It was also a study of his most famous cases,
including his successful criminal defense of the late (but still famous in
1962) lawyer Clarence Darrow.4 6 It was on the Best Sellers list for forty
weeks, from September 16, 1962, to June 16, 1963. 47 Finally, Edward
Bennett Williams, a well-known criminal defense lawyer in Washington,
D.C., wrote a book calling for society to better defend civil liberties.
4 8
Williams used his overarching theme to help explain his representation of
various unpopular figures, from Wisconsin Senator Joe McCarthy
(anathema on the left) and New York City Congressman Adam Clayton
Powell (anathema on the right) to Jimmy Hoffa, Mafioso Frank Costello,
and even an alleged Soviet spy.4 9 Although Williams's list of clients made
40. See New York Times Best Sellers List, HAWES PUBL'NS, http://www.hawes.com/1955/1955-
11-20.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2014) (listing weekly New York Times Best Sellers lists). Thanks to
Stacy Fowler for compiling these data.
41. Roger K. Newman, Ehrlich, Jacob W (ake), in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN LAW 183, 183 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009).
42. See LOUIS NIZER, MY LIFE IN COURT (1961); see also Roger K. Newman, Nizer, Louis, in
YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 401, 401-02 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009)
(tracing Nizer's career as a civil litigator).
43. New York Times Best Sellers List, HAWES PUBL'NS, http://hawes.com/1963/1963-04-14.pdf
(last visited Sept. 20, 2014).
44. ADELA ROGERS ST. JOHNS, FINAL VERDICT (1962).
45. Id.
46. Id. Darrow was charged with bribing a juror in a criminal case involving the McNamara
brothers, who were eventually convicted of bombing the pressroom building of the Los Angeles Times.
See JOHN A. FARRELL, CLARENCE DARROW: ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED 206-33 (2011)
(recounting the bombing and subsequent trial of the McNamara brothers); id. at 234-64 (discussing
the trial and not guilty verdict in bribery case against Darrow).
47. New York Times Best Sellers List, HAWES PUBL'Ns, http://hawes.com/1963/1963-06-16.pdf
(last visited Aug. 29, 2014).
48. EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS, ONE MAN'S FREEDOM (1962).
49. See id. at 5 ("I decided to put myself on a list of lawyers who were willing to defend people
without fee .... Most of these clients were not only penniless but friendless.").
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for possibly sensational reading, the book itself was written in a sober,
though accessible, manner. One Man's Freedom made the New York Times
Best Sellers list sixteen of the seventeen weeks from July 8, 1962, through
October 28, 1962.50
Fictional works about law and lawyers were also popular at this time.
Robert Traver's Anatomy of a Murder5" was on the New York Times Best
Sellers list for sixty-one weeks from March 1958 through April 1959,
including twenty-nine weeks at number one.52 Harper Lee's To Kill a
Mockingbird won the Pulitzer Prize, was on the New York Times Best
Sellers list for ninety-eight weeks from mid-1960 through mid-1962, and
has remained in print since its publication.' 3
In September 1957, the show Perry Mason premiered on CBS.5 4 CBS
aired 271 episodes of the show, which ended in May 1966."5 During its
first six seasons, the show was always one of the thirty highest rated
television shows.' 6 Although prosecutor Hamilton Burger usually played
the fool on Perry Mason, the title character was portrayed as a paragon of
virtue, the lawyer as a crusading knight and modern hero. The success of
Perry Mason led to the production and airing of other dramas based on the
lawyer in the courtroom. In the edgier television series The Defenders
(1961-1964), one goal of the creator was to show a more "realistic
portrayal of the legal profession at work"' 7 than shown in Perry Mason.
50. New York Times Best Sellers List, HAWES PUBL'NS, http://hawes.com/1962/1962-10-28.pdf
(last visited Sept. 20, 2014).
51. ROBERT TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER (1958). Traver was the pseudonym of
Michigan Supreme Court Justice John D. Voelker. On Voelker, see William Domnarski, Voelker,
John D., in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 562 (Roger K. Newman ed.,
2009).
52. New York Times Best Sellers List, HAWES PUBL'NS, http://hawes.com/1959/1959-04-19.pdf
(last visited Sept. 20, 2014).
53. HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960). It was on the list from July 11, 1960,
through June 17, 1962. New York Times Best Sellers List, HAWES PUBL'NS,
http://hawes.com/1962/1962-06-17.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2014).
54. Francis M. Nevins, Perry Mason, in LAWYERS IN YOUR LIVING ROOM! LAW ON
TELEVISION 51, 51 (Michael Asimow ed., 2009); see also Norman Rosenberg, Perry Mason, in PRIME
TIME LAW: FICTIONAL TELEVISION AS LEGAL NARRATIVE 115, 11528 (Robert M. Jarvis & Paul R
Joseph eds., 1998) (examining the classic show Perry Mason).
55. Francis M. Nevins, Perry Mason, in LAWYERS IN YOUR LIVING ROOM! LAW ON
TELEVISION 51, 58 (Michael Asimow ed., 2009).
56. See TIM BROOKS & EARLE MARSH, THE COMPLETE DIRECTORY TO PRIME TIME
NETWORK AND CABLE TV SHOWS, 1946-PRESENT, at 1682-84 (9th ed. 2007). It was not in the
top thirty during its last three years on the air. Id.
57. David R. Ginsburg, The Defenders: TV Lawyers and Controversy in the New Frontier, in
LAWYERS IN YOUR LIVING ROOM! LAW ON TELEVISION 63, 66 (Michael Asimow ed., 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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But as was true in Perry Mason, the lawyers in The Defenders were also
unfailingly portrayed as heroic figures. The Defenders indirectly begat Sam
Benedict,58 another lawyer drama. Sam Benedict was on the air for one
year, and fictionalized some of the cases undertaken by San Francisco
lawyer Jake Ehrlich.59 After General Electric Theater was canceled in mid-
1962, it was replaced by another show sponsored by General Electric, G.E.
True. Its initial episode in fall 1962 was a "lionization" of the lawyer
Clarence Darrow, who had died twenty-four years earlier. 60
This era has also been called the "golden age" 6 1 of the law film, as well
as the "halcyon days of heroic cine-lawyers." 62  From 1957 to 1962, a
plethora of movies were released to critical acclaim and commercial
success, including 12 Angry Men (1957),63 Paths of Glory (1957),64
Witness for the Prosecution (1957),65 Anatomy of a Murder (1959),66
Inherit the Wind (1960),67 Judgment at Nuremburg (1961),68 Billy Budd
(1962),69 and To Kill a Mockingbird (1962).7 0  Even when the law was
shown to have failed, as in Billy Budd, in which the title character, a sailor,
is legally though unjustifiably sentenced to die, a lesson imparted to the
viewer was that "men are perishable things, but justice will live as long as
the human soul, and the law as long as the human mind."'
7 1
Another event that may suggest an elevated public standing for lawyers
58. TIM BROOKS & EARLE MARSH, THE COMPLETE DIRECTORY TO PRIME TIME
NETWORK AND CABLE TV SHOWS, 1946-PRESENT, at 1682-84 (9th ed. 2007).
59. Id. at 1190.
60. RICK PERLSTEIN, THE INVISIBLE BRIDGE: THE FALL OF NIXON AND THE RISE OF
REAGAN 406 (2014). Darrow died on March 13, 1938. See JOHN A. FARRELL, CLARENCE
DARROW: ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED 465 (2011) (recounting Darrow's career as a defense
attorney); Randal Tietjen, Darrow, Clarence S., in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
LAW 149,149 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009).
61. David Ray Papke, Conventional Wisdom: The Courtroom Trial in American Popular Culture,
82 MARQ. L. REV. 471, 475 (1999) (citing Francis M. Nevins, Law, Lawyers andJustice in Popular
Fiction and Film, HUMAN. EDUC., May 1984, at 4).
62. PAUL BERGMAN & MICHAEL ASIMOW, REEL JUSTICE: THE COURTROOM GOES TO THE
MOVIES 1 (rev. ed. 2006).
63. 12 ANGRY MEN (United Artists 1957).
64. PATHS OF GLORY (United Artists 1957).
65. WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION (United Artists 1957).
66. ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Columbia 1959).
67. INHERIT THE WIND (United Artists 1960).
68. JUDGMENT AT NUREMBURG (United Artists 1961).
69. BILLY BUDD (Allied Artists 1962). This film was based on the novella by Herman
Melville. Herman Melville, Billy Budd, in BILLY BUDD AND OTHER TALES 7 (Signet Classic 1956)
(1948).
70. To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (United Artists 1962).
71. PAUL BERGMAN & MICHAEL ASIMOW, REEL JUSTICE: THE COURTROOM GOES TO THE
MOVIES 301 (rev. ed. 2006) (quoting BILLY BUDD (Allied Artists 1962)).
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was the national celebration of "Law Day" on May 1, beginning in 1958.
Law Day was initially created by the ABA in order to cultivate in the
people that "respect for law that is so vital to the democratic way of life," 72
and was officially recognized by an Act of Congress in 1961 .7 3  Law Day
was a Cold War response to the Soviet Union's May Day celebrations, 74
when military parades in Moscow were a familiar sight on the American
evening news. As noted by the ABA's then-President Charles Rhyne
concerning the first Law Day:
The selection of May 1 as "Law Day-U.S.A." has great significance. May 1
is also the day on which international Communism celebrates its past
victories and looks forward to its future conquests. There could be no better
date for us to recall the basic moral and philosophical principles upon which
our society is based, and to contrast them with the cynical, immoral and
atheistic philosophy which underlies the international Communist
conspiracy.
7 5
The movement to create Law Day occurred when American lawyers
perceived themselves as peculiarly capable of solving apparently intractable
problems. Walter E. Craig, ABA President from 1963 to 1964, declared
in his Presidential Address, "It seems to me that today as possibly never
before the legal profession must meet the challenge of maintaining order in
our society, in maintaining respect for the judicial process and the courts
and maintaining respect and confidence in the legislative process."'76  In
the wake of the success of Law Day, the ABA decided to use the talents of
its members for an even greater cause. It created a special committee
72. Law Day, U.S.A., 36 U.S.C. § 113(b)(2) (2012). The first Law Day was May 1, 1958,
pursuant to a Presidential Proclamation dated February 3, 1958 by Dwight D. Eisenhower at the
behest of ABA President Charles S. Rhyne. See The President's Proclamation, 44 A.B.A. J. 342, 343
(1958) (approving May 1st as Law Day); see also Jason Krause, Charlie Rhyne's Big Idea, 94 A.B.A. J.
62, 65 (2008) (crediting Charlie Rhyne with originating Law Day). See generally David Ray Papke,
Law Day, in OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 491 (2002) (describing the formation and
purpose of Law Day).
73. Law Day, U.S.A., Pub. L. No. 87-20, 75 Stat. 43 (1961) (codified at 36 U.S.C. § 113
(Supp. IV 1998)).
74. May 1 was acknowledged in the United States and Europe shortly after the Chicago
Haymarket Square riots in 1884 as "International Workers' Day." In 1894, possibly to sever the link
with the events in Haymarket Square, the United States government adopted the first Monday in
September as Labor Day. See Pub. L. No. 53-118, 28 Stat. 96 (1894) (designating the first Monday
of September in each year as Labor Day).
75. Charles S. Rhyne, "Law Day-US.A. " Emphasizing the Supremacy of Law, 44 A.B.A. J.
313, 313 (1958).
76. See Walter E. Craig, The President's Annual Address: The Challenges of Professional
Responsibility, 50 A.B.A. J. 824, 828 (1964) (addressing the necessity of law and legal professions in
maintaining society), reprinted in 89 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 435, 435 (1965).
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dedicated to bringing about "World Peace through Law. ' 7 7
Charles Rhyne claimed Law Day symbolized the difference between the
Soviet Union and the United States, for only Americans "live under the
rule of law."'78  More importantly, the creation of Law Day reflected the
view of the American lawyer establishment that an effective rule of law
required continued maintenance by lawyers of the line dividing the rule of
law from the rule of persons. 7 9  These twinned beliefs, that the United
States adhered to the rule of law and that lawyers maintained the rule of
law, would be challenged by self-described "radical" and "movement"
lawyers as the United States entered the convulsive latter half of the 1960s.
B. The Transition in Legal Ethics, 1946-1964
In the aftermath of World War II, the ABA approved the commission of
a Survey of the Legal Profession.8 ° The purpose of the survey was to study
"the functioning of lawyers in a free society." '81 One of the six areas
scheduled for study was professional competence and integrity, which
comprised studies of legal education, admission to the Bar, and legal
ethics. 82 By 1953, over 150 reports on the six areas of study had been
completed, including ten on legal ethics. 8 3  One of those studies,
published in the Virginia Law Review in 1951,84 evaluated the belief of
lawyers of professional adherence to the Canons of Ethics. It concluded,
"The very definite impression made upon the mind of one reading the
replies to these questionnaires is that the Bar of the United States, with
comparatively rare exceptions, maintains a strict observance of the ethics
77. See Charles S. Rhyne, World Peace Through Law, 83 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 624 (1958)
(printing the President's Annual Address). The Special Committee on World Peace through Law was
created by ABA President Rhyne that year.
78. Charles S. Rhyne, "Law Day-US.A. " Emphasizing the Supremacy of Law, 44 A.B.A. J.
313, 313 (1958).
79. See Walter E. Craig, The President's Annual Address: The Challenges of Professional
Responsibility, 50 A.B.A. J. 824, 828 (1964) (calling for lawyers to strive to maintain the rule of law);
Charles S. Rhyne, "Law Day-U.S.A. "- Emphasizing the Supremacy of Law, 44 A.B.A. J. 313, 315
(1958) (emphasizing the leadership role of lawyers).
80. Proceedings of the 1946Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 71 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 307,
310 (1946).
81. Id. at 309-10.
82. Reginald Heber Smith, Survey of the Legal Profession: Its Scope, Methods and Objectives, 39
A.B.A.J. 548, 549 (1953).
83. Id. at 550, 553.
84. See Robert T. McCracken, Report on Observance by the Bar of Stated Professional Standards,
37 VA. L. REV. 399, 399 (1951) ("The purpose of this section of the Survey is to ascertain to what
extent is there adherence to, or deviation from, the Canons by the lawyers in each community or
state.").
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standards set forth in the Canons." 85 A 1952 book, Conduct ofJudges and
Lawyers: A Study of Professional Ethics,86 was more cautious. The authors
suggested a reconsideration of the Canons, if only to reassure the public
and the legal profession of their continued value: "Perhaps the time has
come for a public reaffirmation of the standards of the profession with
more adequate emphasis on their significance."'8 7
For reasons that are unclear, a special commission of the ABA was
charged in 1956 with studying the Canons.88  The American Bar
Foundation, founded by the ABA in 1952, created a special committee to
study the Canons one year earlier.8 9 And a relatively new organization,
the American College of Trial Lawyers, 9" agreed in 1956 on a Code of
Trial Conduct, which was published in 1957 in the ABA Journal.9 1 On
June 30, 1958, the Special Committee of the American Bar Foundation
issued its report, concluding "[T]he present Canons of Professional Ethics
of the American Bar Association do not provide adequate standards of
professional conduct for members of the Bar."9 2 Two weeks later, the
Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, consisting of members of
the ABA and the Association of American Law Schools, and in existence
85. Robert T. McCracken, Report on Observance by the Bar of Stated Professional Standards, 37
VA. L. REV. 399, 425 (1951).
86. ORIE PHILLIPS & PHILBRICK MCCOY, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS: A STUDY
OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1952).
87. Id. at 20. Several other books were published about this time on lawyers and legal ethics.
See HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS, at xi (1953) (exploring the meaning of ethics within the
legal profession); see also ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CHARLES 0. PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAWYER:
A SUMMARY OF THE SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, at v (1954) (delineating the scope of the
book to cover the recent history of the Survey of the Legal Profession). Drinker believed the "basic
standards" expressed in the Canons were sufficient. See HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 3
(1953) (determining that the original Canons need not be altered). Blaustein and Porter were more
skeptical. They concluded, quoting a 1934 statement of Harlan F. Stone, that the Canons were
"generalizations designed for an earlier era." ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CHARLES 0. PORTER,
AMERICAN LAWYER: A SUMMARY OF THE SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 251 (1954)
(suggesting that the Canons should change with the times (quoting Harlan F. Stone, The Public
Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1934))).
88. Philbrick McCoy, The Canons of Ethics: A Reappraisal by the Organized Bar, 43 A.B.A. J.
38, 38 (1957).
89. Id.
90. See MARION A. ELLIS & HOWARD E. COVINGTON, JR., SAGES OF THEIR CRAFT: THE
FIRST FIFTY YEARS OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS 18-23 (2000) (noting its
creation in 1950).
91. A Code of Trial Conduct: Promulgated by the College of Trial Lawyers, 43 A.B.A. J. 223, 223
(1957). The College amended its Code in early 1963. Sherman S. Welpton, Jr., Genesis of the Code
of Trial Conduct, 58 A.B.A.J. 709, 709 (1972).
92. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION ON
CANONS OF ETHICS 96 (1958).
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since 1952, issued a report attempting to reorient the legal profession's
understanding of the role and meaning of standards of ethical conduct.
9 3
Ignoring the report of its sister organization, the ABA's House of Delegates
approved the Joint Conference's report at its 1959 annual meeting. 94
Despite this flurry of activity, no other organized effort regarding legal
ethics took place for five years. 9 5  Less than three weeks after the murder
of President John F. Kennedy, San Francisco lawyer Melvin Belli gave a
public statement and answered several questions from reporters regarding
his decision to represent Jack Ruby in the shooting of Lee Harvey Oswald.
Belli noted the existence of an "admonition" from the court not to discuss
the case, and stated his intention to obey the ethical requirements of the
local bar. 96 In mid-February 1964, jury selection began in the murder
trial of Jack Ruby, a trial that generated an intense public interest that
continued until the trial's end a month later.9 7 As noted by Belli, during
the trial the "standard pattern" was for "[t]wo to three television cameras"
to be placed on elevated platforms at the courthouse entrance, for
photographers to mill about in "roped-off areas in the second floor
corridor," and for the reporters who received tickets to begin entering the
courtroom at 8:00 a.m., an hour before trial proceedings began. 98 The
sheriff, in Belli's telling, aimed to cooperate by making sure Ruby was led
past reporters at "the right pace." 99  Though Belli's taped pretrial
comments were made with equanimity, his comments after the trial may
93. For further discussion of the Report of the Joint Conference, see Lon L. Fuller & John D.
Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1159 (1958);
Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: A Statement, 11 S.C. L.Q. 306 (1959);
see also Michael S. Ariens, American Legal Ethics in an Age ofAnxiety, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 343, 426-
33 (2008); John M. A. DiPippa, Lon Fuller, the Model Code, and the Model Rules, 37 S. TEX. L. REV.
303, 328 (1996).
94. Proceedings of the 1959 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 84 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 502,
541-42 (1959).
95. The only reference to the Canons or to a code of ethics in the annual report of the ABA was
an August 1963 statement in a supplemental report by its Standing Committee on Professional
Ethics in 1963 suggesting state and local bar associations better inform lawyers of the Canons of
Professional Ethics through panel discussions. See Supplemental Report of the Standing Committee on
Professional Ethics, 88 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 575, 575 (1963) (relaying the need for panel discussions to
better inform lawyers of the Canons); see also Michael S. Ariens, American Legal Ethics in an Age of
Anxiety, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 343, 433-36 (2008) (suggesting reasons why call occurred in 1964).
96. December 10, 1963-San Francisco lawyer Melvin Belli takes over Jack Ruby case in Dallas,
Texas, YouTUBE (Jan. 25, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ffP2Wzh34_g (Melvin Belli's
press conference).
97. See MELVIN M. BELLI WITH MAURICE C. CARROLL, DALLAS JUSTICE: THE REAL STORY
OF JACK RUBY AND HIS TRIAL 113 (1964) (providing a biased presentation).
98. Id. at 144-45.
99. Id. at 145.
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have been the spark that led the ABA's Board of Governors to recommend
the House of Delegates create a Special Committee on Evaluation of
Ethical Standards. 1 0 After the guilty verdict, Belli said the trial was the
"biggest kangaroo-court disgrace in the history of American law."10 1  In
response, ABA President Walter Craig publicly disparaged Belli's
statements, declaring, "The canons of ethics provide that a lawyer having
any justified grievance against a member of the judiciary should lodge that
grievance with the appropriate authorities and not indulge in public
defamation."102 Craig continued: "That [Belli] should so flagrantly
disregard the code of professional ethics and his oath as an attorney is a
discredit to him and to his profession." 10 3 Craig's Presidential Address in
August 1964 was titled The Challenges of Professional Responsibility.'0 4
One of the three challenges listed by Craig was the possible harm to a fair
trial caused by public statements made by unnamed lawyers concerning
pending litigation. 10 5
A day after Craig's speech, incoming ABA President Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
spoke to the House of Delegates to obtain its approval to create the Special
Committee. 10 6  He also referenced the Ruby trial: "[R]ecent events in
Dallas, familiar to all of us, have stimulated a new and intense interest in
the Canons, particularly those designed to prevent prejudicial publicity
and to ensure fair trial."'1 7 Powell also suggested to the House that the
reform of the Canons was a modest rather than far-reaching effort: "There
is certainly no thought of starting out to rewrite de novo the ethical
standards of the legal profession."' 108 At the same time, "in view of the
100. See Report of the Board of Governors, 89 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 414, 421 (1964) (resolving to
request the House of Delegates create Special Committee on Ethical Standards).
101. Casus Belli, TIME, Mar. 27, 1964, at 34.
102. Id.; see also MELVIN M. BELLI WITH MAURICE C. CARROLL, DALLAS JUSTICE: THE REAL
STORY OF JACK RUBYAND HIS TRIAL 34 (1964) (noting and rejecting Craig's comments).
103. Casus Belli, TIME, Mar. 27, 1964, at 34.
104. Walter E. Craig, The President's Annual Address: The Challenges of Professional
Responsibility, 50 A.B.A. J. 824 (1964).
105. Id. at 825-26. Belli had nothing but contempt for Craig and the ABA. See MELVIN M.
BELLI WITH MAURICE C. CARROLL, DALLAS JUSTICE: THE REAL STORY OF JACK RUBY AND HIS
TRIAL 34-35 (1964) ("My grievances with the American Bar Association are of long standing.").
Shortly after these contretemps he resigned from the ABA. See MARION A. ELLIS & HOWARD E.
COVINGTON, JR., SAGES OF THEIR CRAFT: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE
OF TRIAL LAwYERS 58 (2000) ("Belli soon resigned from the ABA.").
106. See Proceedings of the 1964 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 89 A.B.A. ANN. REP.
365, 380-81 (1965) (providing a transcript of President Lewis F. Powell, Jr.'s discussion regarding
the Board's recommendation to create a Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards).
107. Id. at 381. Powell also declared, "But the need for a critical reexamination is far broader
than may be indicated by those events in Dallas." Id.
108. Id.
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changed conditions since 1908 and the experience of the past half-century,
the time has surely come for the American Bar Association to take a careful
look at this critical area of our responsibility." l09 The House of Delegates
adopted the proposed resolution, making just one change. It charged the
Special Committee with the task of proposing recommendations that "may
be deemed appropriate to encourage and maintain the highest level of
ethical standards by the legal profession." 110
For many in leadership positions in the American Bar, the early 1960s
were a time of hope and optimism, for lawyers were important. Walter
Craig's 1964 comments to his ABA colleagues verged on hubris:
The defense and the survival of our nation will not rest solely upon the
preparedness and courage of our Armed Forces, nor upon the strength of our
nuclear weapons, but will rest equally upon the moral and intellectual
courage and understanding of our people. Who are better equipped among
all the segments of our society than the members of the legal profession to
assert the leadership required to instill among our people that moral and
intellectual courage necessary to the survival of the philosophy of the rule of
law and freedom under law?1 11
Craig's assertion that lawyers were essential to maintaining a republic
was joined by complacency within the ABA about the state of the legal
profession. When ABA President Powell urged the House of Delegates to
create the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, he
quoted University of Texas Law School Professor Jerre Williams to justify
in part his request: "The best way to attain better ethics in the legal
profession is to have a few more good disbarments." 112 Although Powell
did not wholly join in Williams's sentiments, both worked from the same
premise: If the legal profession could just rid itself of those few bad apples,
it would be relatively easy to reach "the highest level of ethical
standards."1 1 3
109. Id. at 382.
110. See id. at 383 (amending the resolution "by submitting the words 'the highest level' for
the words 'a high level"' prior to adoption).
111. Walter E. Craig, The President's Annual Address: The Challenges of Professional
Responsibility, 50 A.BA. J. 824, 828 (1964).
112. Proceedings of the 1964 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 89 A.B.A. ANN. REP.
365, 382 (1964).
113. Id. at 382-83 (showing Powell's views on disciplinary actions in the legal profession).
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C. Creating the Code of Professional Responsibility, 1964-1969
The Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, known as
the Wright Committee after its chairman, Arkansas lawyer Edward L.
Wright, largely met in secret for the next four years.1 14 Its annual report
to the ABA for the years 1965-1968 consisted of either a brief, an
uninformative statement, or no report at all. 1 15 In October 1968, the
Wright Committee sent a tentative draft to a group of 550 lawyers for
comments. In January 1969, the preliminary draft was sent to 20,000
lawyers.' 16  After receiving "hundreds" of comments, the Wright
Committee made a few changes, and presented its final draft to the ABA
House of Delegates on July 1, 1969. When the House of Delegates began
discussing the proposed Code, the chairman of another ABA section
proposed amending the rule relaxing the restrictions on group legal
services, a long-standing issue of the ABA. 1 7 After a brief debate, the
proposed amendment was defeated.' 18 The House of Delegates then
adopted the proposed Code of Professional Responsibility without
amendment. 119
114. Wright wanted to wait to release a full preliminary report, and convinced the committee
of this approach. See Interview by Olavi Maru with Edward L. Wright, Chairman, Special Comm.
on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, in Little Rock, Ark. (Oct. 28, 1976), in AMERICAN BAR
FOUNDATION PROGRAM ON ORAL HISTORY 10 (on file with author) (responding that the decision
was not to publicize partial drafts). Wright believed that if the Committee released portions of the
Code, or drafts thereof, the Committee would not have received "a unified impression or reaction
from the [Blar." Id.
115. A review of the annual reports of the ABA between 1964 and 1968 shows that the Special
Committee filed no report in several years, and in others filed a brief report indicating the Committee
was continuing its work.
116. Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, 94 A.B.A. ANN. REP.
728, 728 (1969).
117. See R. W. Nahstoll, Limitations on Group Legal Services Arrangements Under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, DR 2-103(D)(5): Stale Wine in New Bottles, 48 TEX. L. REV. 334, 334
(1970) (noting restrictive and regressive approach taken regarding the issue). See generally Michael S.
Ariens, American Legal Ethics in an Age of Anxiety, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 343, 442-43 (2008)
(discussing how the issue of group legal services was handled by the Special Committee).
118. See Proceedings of the 1969 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 94 A.B.A. ANN. REP.
378, 389-92 (1969) ("When the McCalpin amendment was put to a vote it failed.").
119. See id. at 392 ("[T]he House went on to adopt the code as written by the Committee on
Evaluation of Ethical Standards.").
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III. SOCIETAL AND PROFESSIONAL DISCONTENT, 1965-1977
A. Introduction
A good case can be made for various dates embracing both the
beginning and the end of "the Sixties."u 20 In the 1960 presidential
election, forty-three-year-old John F. Kennedy defeated Richard M. Nixon
in the race to follow Dwight D. Eisenhower, becoming the youngest
elected President in American history. 12 ' In summer 1961, Freedom
Riders took interstate buses to the South to continue the struggle to end
segregation and foster civil rights.122 Students for a Democratic Society,
representing in part what would become known as the "New Left," issued
its Port Huron statement in 1962, which began, "We are people of this
generation, bred in at least modest comfort, housed now in universities,
looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit." 123  The March on
Washington for Jobs and Freedom, led by Martin Luther King Jr., took
place in summer 1963, following the civil rights boycott of Birmingham,
Alabama that spring. 124 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was signed into law
on July 2 by President Lyndon B. Johnson. 125
The end of the Sixties arguably arrived as early as 1968, when Richard
M. Nixon-defeated in both the 1960 presidential race and the 1962
California gubernatorial race-won the presidency. 1 26  Both Martin
Luther King Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy were assassinated in 1968, and the
120. See, e.g., JAMES T. PATTERSON, THE EVE OF DESTRUCTION: How 1965
TRANSFORMED AMERICA, at xii-xvi (2012) (noting options available to historians to choose among
several years and making argument the Sixties began in 1965 in part because "[b]y mid-summer
[1965] ... the pervasive optimism of late 1964 and early 1965 was already ebbing"). See generally
TODD GITLIN, THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF RAGE (1987) (discussing the Sixties).
121. JAMES T. PATTERSON, THE EVE OF DESTRUCTION: HOW 1965 TRANSFORMED
AMERICA, at xv (2012).
122. See generally RAYMOND ARSENAULT, FREEDOM RIDERS: 1961 AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE 1 (2006) (considering the ramifications of CORE's actions).
123. JAMES MILLER, DEMOCRACY IS IN THE STREETS: FROM PORT HURON TO THE SIEGE
OF CHICAGO 329 (1987).
124. JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1974, at
444 (1996).
125. See ROBERT A. CARO, THE PASSAGE OF POWER 569 (2012) (stating that President
Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law on July 2); CLAY RISEN, THE BILL OF THE
CENTURY: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 1 (2014) ("In the intervening hours and
a thousand miles away, President Lyndon B. Johnson had signed into law the Civil Rights Act of
1964.").
126. See generally MARK KURLANSKY, 1968: THE YEAR THAT ROCKED THE WORLD (2005)
(indicating events of 1968 ended the Sixties).
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United States was again engulfed in major urban riots. 12 7  In 1969, the
United States landed men on the moon, and the Warren Court came to an
end with the retirement of Earl Warren 128 and the resignation of Abe
Fortas. 12 9 In 1970, bombing was apparently all the rage. The United
States bombed Cambodia.1 30 Over 250 bombings were linked to radical
groups, including the bombing of Sterling Hall at the University of
Wisconsin at Madison, killing a researcher. 13 1 In March, a bomb created
by the radical group Weather Underground blew up prematurely,
destroying a Greenwich Village townhouse and killing three of its
members. 132  Students were killed at both Jackson State College and,
more notoriously, at Kent State University. 133 In 1972, "Nixon then had
the pleasure of watching the Democrats tear themselves apart. "134
Portraying himself as "the defender of 'law and order,"' 13 5 and
Democratic Party candidates as "soft on crime, "136 Nixon overwhelmingly
won re-election, garnering over 60% of the popular vote and the electoral
vote of every state but Massachusetts and the District of Columbia.1
3 7
United States ground troops left Vietnam in 1973, and during the summer
congressional hearings on the Watergate scandal dominated television
coverage. 1 38  In August 1974, Nixon resigned from office to avoid
impeachment. 1 3 9
In terms of beginnings, what makes 1965 a pivotal or transformative
year is the societal shift from the optimism of the early 1960s to a
pessimism that hovered over the next decade. 140  Evidence of this
127. See generally id.
128. See G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 307-13 (1982).
129. See LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 373-74 (1990).
130. See JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1974,
at 750-51 (1996).
131. See id. at 716 ("[T]here were at least 250 bombings linked to white-dominated radical
groups in the United States."). Patterson notes the government believed the actual number of
bombings was six times greater. See id. at 717.
132. Seeid. at 717.
133. Seeid. at 755.
134. Seeid. at 759.
135. See id. at 762.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 764.
138. See id. at 771 ("Even as the United States was pulling the last of its soldiers out of combat
in Vietnam, the scandal known as Watergate was beginning to wreck Nixon's second
administration.").
139. See id. at 771-73.
140. See, e.g., JAMES T. PATTERSON, THE EVE OF DESTRUCTION: HOw 1965
TRANSFORMED AMERICA, at xii (2012) (arguing, "By mid-summer [1965] ... the pervasive
optimism of late 1964 and early 1965 was already ebbing"); see also WILLIAM L. O'NEILL, COMING
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optimism is found in a 1964 Gallup Poll. 14 1 It found that 75% of
Americans believed the government would "do what is right most of the
time."' 42  In 1965, the war in Vietnam became an American war, as
President Johnson ordered bombing in February and sent in the first
American combat troops in March.' 4 3  That same month, broadcast
networks televised law enforcement officers in Selma, Alabama, beating
civil rights demonstrators on what became known as Bloody Sunday. 1
44
The Watts riots occurred August 11-17, less than a week after the Voting
Rights Act became law.' 4 5  The end of American participation in the
Vietnam War in 1973 and the resignation in August 1974 of President
Richard Nixon suggest an end of the Sixties. So, too, did the first oil
shock, which began in October 1973 as member nations of the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) protested
American support of Israel in the Arab-Israeli War.146 The oil embargo
foreshadowed both an end to a lengthy era of economic good times, 147
and an end of American economic dominion across much of the world.
By mid-1974, the United States officially entered a recession. 148  The
increase in distrust of the government over ten years was extraordinary.' 49
In 1974, in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, Gallup again asked
Americans if they trusted their government to "do what is right most of the
time."1 5' Now, 62% believed the government would not do what is right
most of the time. 151
The shift in films in the portrayal of the legal system and of lawyers also
suggested a drenching pessimism in American society in the mid and late
1970s. Such films as Chinatown (1974),152 ... And Justice for All
APART: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF AMERICA IN THE 1960'S, at 7 (1978) (noting after 1965
America had "precious little of either" progress or stability).
141. See RICK PERLSTEIN, THE INVISIBLE BRIDGE: THE FALL OF NIXON AND THE RISE OF
REAGAN 276 (2014).
142. See id.
143. See JAMES T. PATTERSON, THE EVE OF DESTRUCTION: How 1965 TRANSFORMED
AMERICA 65, 95 (2012).
144. See id.
145. See id. at xii-xiii.
146. Seeid. at 784.
147. Seeid. at 785.
148. Seeid. at 790.




152. CHINATOWN (Paramount Pictures 1974).
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(1979),153 and Kramer v. Kramer (1979), 15 4 as well as other movies of the
early 1980s, 15 5 painted the legal system as corrupt. Most lawyers (other
than the conflicted and vulnerable protagonist) were shown as participants
in corruption.
Further evidence that 1973-1974 can be considered the end of the
Sixties may also be found in the anxiety and pessimism of an increasing
number of Americans regarding the future. 156 For example, the editor of
Intellectual Digest magazine, speaking on the Today show in February
1973, declared:
For the first time Americans have had at least a partial loss in the
fundamental belief in ourselves. We've always believed we were the new
men, the new people, the new society. The 'last best hope on earth,' in
Lincoln's terms. For the first time we've really begun to doubt it. 15 7
The argument below is that this wrenching shift from optimism to
pessimism reached the American legal profession, tentatively in 1968 and
1969, and more forcefully by 1973.
B. Disorder and Discontent, 1966-1974
Several weeks before the 1965 Watts Riots, Johnson issued Executive
Order 11,236,158 creating the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice. The Commission published
its report in February 1967.159 It began, "There is much crime in
America, more than ever is reported, far more than ever is solved, far too
much for the health of the Nation."'160 Six months later, and in response
to a number of riots in June and July, Johnson issued Executive Order
11,365,161 creating the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders. More popularly known as the Kerner Commission after its
153. ...AND JUSTICE FOR ALL (Columbia Pictures 1979).
154. KRAMER VS. KRAMER (Columbia Pictures 1979).
155. BREAKER MORANT (7 Network 1980); BODY HEAT (Ladd Co. 1981); THE VERDICT
(Twentieth Century Fox 1982).
156. JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1974, at
783 (1996).
157. RICK PERLSTEIN, THE INVISIBLE BRIDGE: THE FALL OF NIXON AND THE RISE OF
REAGAN 7 (2014).
158. Establishing the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, Exec. Order No. 11,236, 30 Fed. Reg. 9,349 (July 28, 1965).
159. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (Feb. 1967).
160. Id. at 1.
161. Establishing a National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Exec. Order No.
11,365, 32 Fed. Reg. 11,111 (Aug. 1, 1967).
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chairman, Illinois Governor Otto Kerner, it issued its final report on
March 1, 1968.162 The Commission called in part for significantly
greater federal funding to reduce economic inequality between the
races. 1 6 3  It also noted that civil disorders, both major and minor,
increased from a reported forty-three in 1966 (which involved
"considerable variations" in violence and property damage),' 1 64 to 164
disorders "during the first nine months of 1967. " 165 The Commission
categorized five of these 1967 disorders as "major" in terms of violence and
damage, and thirty-three as "serious" but not major. 16 6 The public's view
of the 1967 riots may have differed from the Commission's. A February
1968 Gallup Poll asked Americans, choosing from a list of forty options,
what the most important problem was facing the respondent's
community. 167  For the first time ever, the top choice was "crime and
lawlessness."'168  President Johnson, who called the increase in crime "a
public malady," was "incensed" by some of the Kerner Commission's
proposals and recommendations. 1 69 Johnson's pique was in large part a
response to this middle class concern that government needed to do
something to reduce the problem of lawlessness. 170
One month after the publication of the Kerner Commission's report,
Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated in Memphis. Riots occurred after
King's death in several cities, most notably Washington, D.C.' 7 1 In April
1968, there "were more arrests and more injuries ... alone than in all of
1967," "nearly as much property damage," and "nearly as many
disorders."' 172 The biggest difference between civil disorders in 1967 and
those in 1968 was that fewer people were injured or killed in the latter
year.' 73  On June 6, 1968, shortly after midnight in Los Angeles,
Democratic Party presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy was shot and
162. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT (Mar. 1, 1968).
163. Id. at 2.
164. See id. at 21.
165. See id. at 3.
166. Id.
167. Questionnaire Profile: The Gallup Poll #757, GALLUP, http://brain.gallup.com/
documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=AIP00757 (last visited Sept. 25, 2014).
168. See RICK PERLSTEIN, NIXONLAND: THE RISE OF A PRESIDENT AND THE FRACTURING
OF AMERICA 238 (2008).
169. ROBERT DALLEK, FLAWED GIANT: LYNDON JOHNSON AND His TIMES, 1961-1973, at
516 (1998).
170. See id. (indicating lawlessness was the top concern among the middle class).
171. Id
172. Id. (emphasis in original).
173. See id
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killed by Sirhan Sirhan. In response to these murders, Johnson issued
Executive Order 11,412, creating a National Commission on the Causes
and Prevention of Violence. 174  On June 19, Congress adopted the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. 175
The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence
issued its final report in December 1969. Its summary declared, "Violence
in the United States has risen to alarmingly high levels .... [T]he decade
of the 1960s was considerably more violent than the several decades
preceding it and ranks among the most violent in our history." 176  The
Commission listed the increases in reported violent crime between 1960
and 1968: homicide up by 36%, forcible rape by 65%, and increases of
67% in aggravated assaults and 119% in robberies. 177
In the presidential election year of 1968, it was not just Republican
Party candidate Richard Nixon who roused audiences with an appeal to
"law and order."' 17  Proud liberals Robert F. Kennedy and Hubert H.
Humphrey, the eventual Democratic Party presidential nominee, both
included appeals to law and order in their stump speeches. 179
Even after urban riots effectively ended after 1968, the issue of crime
did not abate. In 1973, it was becoming an obsession among
Americans.' 8 0  Cultural evidence of this obsession regarding crime might
be found in the fact that, in fall 1973, the three national television
networks planned on broadcasting a record ten shows involving police and
crime.181 More prosaically, the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports showed an
initial peak of 487.8 violent crimes per 100,000 persons in 1975, over
three times the rate of 160.9 violent crimes per 100,000 persons in
174. Establishing a National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Exec.
Order No. 11,412, 33 Fed. Reg. 8,583 (June 12, 1968).
175. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197.
176. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE CAUSES & PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT, To
ESTABLISH JUSTICE, TO INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY, at xv (1969).
177. Id. at 18.
178. See WILLIAM L. O'NEILL, COMING APART: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF AMERICA IN
THE 1960'S, at 380 (1978) (noting that Nixon appealed to "law and order" in his acceptance speech).
179. See id. at 365, 387 (noting that both Humphrey and Kennedy included an appeal to "law
and order" in speeches). Humphrey's appeal occurred in the aftermath of the riots in Chicago that
took place during the Democratic Party convention. See id. at 383-84 (noting the special report
issued by the President's commission titled Rights in Conflict); cf RICK PERLSTEIN, NIXONLAND:
THE RISE OF A PRESIDENT AND THE FRACTURING OF AMERICA 342-43 (Scribner ed., 2008)
(noting Humphrey's general election commercial on law and order prioritized the war on poverty
over either doubling convictions or building more jails).
180. RICK PERLSTEIN, THE INVISIBLE BRIDGE: THE FALL OF NIXON AND THE RISE OF
REAGAN 61 (2014).
181. Id.
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1960.182
Each of the Commissions created by Executive Order of President
Johnson focused in part on the operation of the criminal justice system,
and each found it wanting. The Task Force Report on the Courts of the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice compiled information on the criminal court system. 1 83  It
concluded, "[A] major need of all courts is better qualified, better trained
personnel."' 8 4 The Commission agreed with its Task Force: The nation
needed "a massive overhaul of the lower criminal courts."' 8 5 The Kerner
Commission echoed this demand for wide-ranging criminal justice
reform. 18 6
The Task Force on Violent Aspects of Protest and Confrontation of the
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence analyzed "the
nature and causes of protest and confrontation in the United States, and
their occasional eruption into violence."'18 7  It concluded that, during
these crises, too few experienced criminal defense lawyers were available,
and "[w]hen lawyers are either untrained, uninterested, or unavailable, the
adversary system becomes a fiction. '
C. Discontent in the American Legal Profession, 1966-1972
In late 1966, Law & Society Review published its first issue. A brief
article titled CivilJustice and the Poor: Issues for Sociological Research' 89 was
followed by the provocatively titled article, The Practice of Law As a
Confidence Game.- Organizational Cooptation of a Profession. 190 Its author,
182. Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, F.B.I., http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/
State/RunCrimeStatebyState.cfm (last revised Mar. 29, 2010). The initial peak in homicides was a
year earlier, 1974. Id. The overall peak for violent crime was an astonishing 758.2 acts per 100,000
persons in 1991. Id. The peak in homicides per 100,000 persons was in 1980. Id
183. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE COURTS (1967).
184. Id. at 1.
185. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 130 (1967) (recommending the lower courts be
abolished or overhauled by state and federal governments).
186. See NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 183 (Mar. 1, 1968).
187. JEROME H. SKOLNICK, THE POLITICS OF PROTEST, at xv (1969).
188. Id. at 297; see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS (1967) ("IT]here are not enough competent criminal
lawyers available to serve even those defendants who can afford to retain counsel.").
189. Jerome E. Carlin, Jan Howard & Sheldon L. Messinger, Civil Justice and the Poor: Issues
for Sociological Research, I LAW & SOC'Y REV. 9 (1967).
190. Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law As a Confidence Game: Organizational
Cooptation of a Profession, 1 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 15 (1967); see also ABRAHAM S. BLUMBERG,
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Abraham S. Blumberg, argued that criminal defense lawyers often acted as
"double agents," serving the ends of the criminal justice bureaucracy rather
than fulfilling their professional duty as zealous advocates for their
clients. 19 1 Blumberg's excoriation of a subset of the lawyer population
may be helpfully contrasted with Lawmen, Medicine Men and Good
Samaritans, published in the ABA Journal earlier in 1966.192 Henry
Foster, a professor of law at New York University, appealed to the ideal of
professionalism in encouraging lawyers to represent the "cause of
unpopular clients."' 193 Foster was well aware of the class division within
the legal profession, and of the view that "[t]he corporate lawyer and even
the general practitioner may regard the criminal and divorce courts as
unsuitable arenas for distinguished counsel."' 94 Foster also discussed the
"sin" of uncaring lawyers, but expressed hope in the Supreme Court's 1963
decision in Gideon v. Wainwright.' 9 5 Gideon's constitutional mandate
that defense counsel be provided beyond capital cases portended good
news, because it "will bring more and better lawyers into the criminal
courts."' 96 Blumberg's view of Gideon was much more pessimistic:
Gideon and related cases "fail to take into account three crucial aspects of
social structure which may tend to render the more libertarian rules as
nugatory."' 97 Two of those crucial aspects concerned "the relationship
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 110-15 (1970) (reiterating conclusions); John Cratsley, The Crime of the Courts,
in WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: AN INDICTMENT OF THE LAW BY YOUNG ADVOCATES 190, 206
(Bruce Wasserstein & Mark J. Green eds., 1970) ("But until the legislators, the electorate, and the
bar are ready to support extensive and very expensive reforms, the adversary process of justice in our
lower courts will continue to be merely preached."). For a critical assessment of lawyers, including
the bar's ethical failings, see MURRAY TEIGH BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 157-91
(1968).
191. See Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law As a Confidence Game: Organizational
Cooptation of a Profession, 1 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 15, 31 (1967).
192. Henry H. Foster Jr., Lawmen, Medicine Men and Good Samaritans, 52 A.B.A. J. 223
(1966).
193. See id. at 224 (indicating the traditional lawyer courageously represented the "cause of
unpopular clients").
194. Id. at 225; see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 57 (1967) ("In many of our larger cities there is a
distinct criminal bar of low legal and dubious ethical quality.").
195. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
196. See Henry H. Foster Jr., Lawmen, Medicine Men and Good Samaritans, 52 A.B.A. J. 223,
225 (1966).
197. Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law As a Confidence Game: Organizational
Cooptation of a Profession, 1 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 15, 38 (1967); see also Robert Lefcourt, Lawyers for
the Poor Can't Win, in LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE: ESSAYS TO DEMYSTIFY LAW, ORDER AND THE
COURTS 123, 127-28 (1971) (noting system of assigning counsel in Houston "is an example of an
assigned counsel system which keeps the [criminal defense] lawyer's practice primary and the client's
interest secondary").
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that the [criminal defense] lawyer-regular actually has with the court
organization" 198 and "the character of the lawyer-client relationship in the
criminal court,"'199 a relationship Blumberg contrasted with the "heroic"
relationship usually found in novels, movies, and television shows.2 ° °
In July 1968, the National Lawyers Guild, an organization of left and
left-leaning lawyers, held its annual convention in Santa Monica.2 0 1 Law
students and new lawyers criticized the Guild as reflecting an era (the fight
against McCarthyism) that had passed, and unable to adapt to an era
("anti-war, anti-draft, and anti-poverty programs") of concern to the New
Left.20 2 A year earlier, those desiring to rebuild the Guild concluded,
"We must now begin to re-think and criticize everything. We must re-
build the Guild in its entirety."20 3  For some long-time members of the
Guild, the challenge of "Movement" lawyers was frustrating, if not
incoherent. "As a lawyer, do you want to make an impact-in some cases
admittedly almost imperceptible-upon the society in which you and 200
million other people live, or do you want just to blow a lot of wind and
merely to give yourselves a big internal bang?"
20 4
The 1968 Guild Convention closed with a talk from UCLA law
professor Richard Wasserstrom. His speech, Lawyers and Revolution,2 ° 5
discussed both "whether the situation in the United States is such that the
198. Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law As a Confidence Game: Organizational
Cooptation of a Profession, 1 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 15, 38 (1967) (emphasis in original). The "lawyer-
regular" was someone who repeatedly represented clients in a particular courtroom or courthouse.
199. Id.; RICHARD HARRIS, JUSTICE: THE CRISIS OF LAW, ORDER, AND FREEDOM IN
AMERICA 57 (1970).
200. Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law As a Confidence Game: Organizational
Cooptation of a Profession, 1 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 15, 38-39 (1967). Blumberg's pessimism suggests
the portrayal of the lawyer as hero in popular culture was at an end. Perry Mason was cancelled in
spring 1966. See generally BRUCE WASSERSTEIN & MARKJ. GREEN, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: AN
INDICTMENT OF THE LAW BY YOUNG ADVOCATES, at xiii (1970) ("Many people [falsely] think of
law as dispensed by white-haired judges in taut courtroom dramas with the defendant having a
Raymond Burr (Perry Mason] or at least an E. G. Marshall [Lawrence Preston in The Defenders] as
his counsel.").
201. Several writings detail the events surrounding the 1968 Guild Convention. Joan
Andersson, 1968: The Way We Were, GUILD NOTES, Jan. 1980, at 1; Joan Andersson et al., The
Confrontational Convention in Santa Monica, 1968, in THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD: FROM
ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 261 (Ann Fagan Ginger & Eugene M. Tobin eds., 1988); David Rein, The
Movement and the Lawyer, 28 GUILD PRAC. 1 (1969).
202. Joan Andersson, 1968: The Way We Were, GUILD NOTES, Jan. 1980, at 1.
203. See id. (quoting a 1967 National Executive Board report of the Executive Secretary).
204. Norman Leonard, The Movement Lawyer as Seen by One Over Fifty, 28 GUILD PRAC. 14,
14 (1969).
205. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers and Revolution, 30 U. PITT. L. REV. 125 (1968), reprinted
in RADICAL LAWYERS: THEIR ROLE IN THE MOVEMENT AND IN THE COURTS 74 (Jonathan Black
ed., 1971).
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only, or the most justifiable, solution is a basically revolutionary one" and,
if so, whether "the lawyer has some unique or even different role to
play."2 °6 Though evincing strong doubts about whether "there has in fact
been" a revolutionary movement, Wasserstrom turned "to the more
specific question of the relationship of the lawyer to radical or
revolutionary programs."'2 0 7 After noting "the lawyer's institutional role,"
the role of impartial advocate, and the role as advocate for an individual,
Wasserstrom concluded the "lawyer's cast of mind" made it "at best
neutral and more typically uncongenial to that of the revolutionary's." 20 8
To Wasserstrom, "the lawyer who is also a radical, or the radical who is
also a lawyer," did possess one complementary attribute: To be "truly
imaginative in consideration of the fundamental ways in which a legal
system might be transformed and yet remain a system that does those
things that ought to be done and that a legal system now does." 20 9
Not all radical lawyers agreed with Wasserstrom's assessment. The
federal criminal trial of the Chicago Eight began in September 1969, a
month after the ABA approved its Code of Professional Responsibility.21 0
The eight defendants were charged with conspiring to incite a riot, and, to
meet federal jurisdictional requirements, of crossing state lines to do so. 2 1 1
The alleged conspiracy arose out of the protests and demonstrations in
Chicago during the 1968 Democratic Party Convention.2 12 The trial
lasted nearly five months, and included the spectacle and specter of one
defendant, Bobby Seale, being bound and gagged by order of the court.2 13
Judge Julius T. Hoffman eventually declared a mistrial in Seale's case, but
also found him guilty of contempt of court and sentenced him to an
unprecedented four years in prison. 214  The judge held each of the
206. Id. at 125.
207. Id. at 126, 128.
208. Id. at 129-30.
209. Id. at 132.
210. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 371 (7th Cir. 1972); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY (1969).
211. Michal R. Belknap, Chicago Conspiracy Case, in OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN
LAW 92, 92 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2002); James T. Ely, Jr., The Chicago Conspiracy Case, in
AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 263, 270 (Michal R. Belknap ed., 1981). See generally JOHN
SCHULTZ, THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY TRIAL (rev. ed., 1993) (providing a first-hand account of
the trial).
212. The 1968 Democratic National Convention was held on Aug. 26-29 in Chicago, I11.
1 CONG. QUARTERLY, INC., GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 490 tbl.12-1 (John L. Moore ed., 6th ed.
2010).
213. James W. Ely, Jr., The Chicago Conspiracy Case, in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 263,
274 (Michael P. Belknap ed., 1981).
214. Id.
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remaining seven defendants, and their two primary lawyers, William
Kunstler 2 15 and Leonard Weinglass, in contempt. 2 16  Hoffman found
Kunstler engaged in twenty-four specifications of contempt, and sentenced
him to over four years in custody, with the sentences running
consecutively.2 17
The jury acquitted all of the defendants of conspiracy and found two
defendants not guilty on all charges. 2 18 The jury found the remaining five
guilty of crossing state lines with intent to incite a riot.2 1 9 The Seventh
Circuit reversed and remanded the contempt citations in mid-1972,22 °
and reversed the convictions later that year.22 1 The Seventh Circuit noted
the duty of the trial court and the prosecutor to meet "high standards" of
conduct, and the "judge's deprecatory and often antagonistic attitude
toward the defense is evident in the record from the very beginning. It
appears in remarks and actions both in the presence and absence of the
jury. ''2 2 2 Hoffman thus failed to meet those required high standards.
Some lawyers concluded Hoffman's attitude was a result of the
pusillanimous behavior of the Bar. One of the defendants, Tom Hayden,
quoted a University of Chicago law professor as saying "it was common
knowledge that this judge callously and insistently degrades and provokes
the lawyers who happen to appear before him unless they come from the
office of the United States Attorney."' 22 3 An analysis of civil disorders in
Chicago in 1968 concluded that the local bar association's decision not to
"criticiz[e] the courts' actions during the riots" was perceived as quietly
supporting those courts, which were overwhelmed by the mass arrests.224
215. William Kunstler was no stranger to controversy. DAVID J. LANGUM, WILLIAM M.
KUNSTLER: THE MOST HATED LAWYER IN AMERICA (1999); WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER WITH
SHEILA ISENBERG, MYLIFEASA RADICAL LAWYER (1994); David J. Langum, Sr., Kunstler, William
M., in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 320, 320 (Roger K. Newman ed.,
2008).
216. James W. Ely, Jr., The Chicago Conspiracy Case, in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 263,
276 (Michael R. Belknap ed., 1981).
217. Id. Hoffman conducted the contempt proceedings after the jury retired to deliberate and
sentenced Kunstler to consecutive short-term sentences to circumvent a limit imposed by case law
preventing "sentences of no more than six months without a jury trial." DAVID J. LANGUM,
WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER: THE MOST HATED LAWYER IN AMERICA 118-19 (1999).
218. James W. Ely, Jr., The Chicago Conspiracy Case, in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 263,
277 (Michael R. Belknap ed., 1981).
219. Id.; DAVID J. LANGUM, WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER: THE MOST HATED LAWYER IN
AMERICA 119 (1999).
220. In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 389 (7th Cir. 1972).
221. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 409 (7th Cir. 1972).
222. Id. at 386.
223. TOM HAYDEN, TRIAL 51 (1970) (quoting an unnamed professor).
224. JEROME H. SKOLNICK, THE POLITICS OF PROTEST 298 (1969).
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The government did not retry the Chicago Seven, and never tried
Seale. 22 5 It did retry the contempt citations in 1973, and the judge
hearing the case by designation found three of the defendants and attorney
William Kunstler guilty, the latter of two specifications of contempt. 2 26
That decision was affirmed on appeal.227
Even a critic of the behavior of the defendants concluded, "The Chicago
Conspiracy trial was not one of the august moments in American
jurisprudence."'2 28  Critics of the American legal system perceived the trial
judge's behavior as exemplifying the absence of a true system of justice.22 9
Some radical lawyers concluded the conjunction of "radical" and
"lawyer" often made no sense: "It is impossible to be a political radical
while playing the games of the system in court. The confines and biases of
the lawyer's role are a continuing damper on his activity as a radical, let
alone a revolutionary." 230  One radical lawyer analogized lawyers to
"prostitutes," because "[t]he system of justice ... [and] especially the legal
profession, is a whorehouse serving those best able to afford the luxuries of
225. James W. Ely, Jr., The Chicago Conspiracy Case, in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 263,
280 (Michael R. Belknap ed., 1981).
226. In re Dellinger, 370 F. Supp. 1304, 1312, 1315, 1319-20 (N.D. Il. 1973), afTd, 502
F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974); DAVID J. LANGUM, WILLIAM M. KUNsTLER: THE MOST HATED
LAWYER IN AMERICA 120 (1999).
227. In re Dellinger, 502 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974).
228. James W. Ely, Jr., The Chicago Conspiracy Case, in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 280
(Michael R. Belknap ed., 1981).
229. See TOM HAYDEN, TRIAL 50-51, 57 (1970) (observing one decision by Hoffman to
exclude testimony was decried by the New York Times as "the ultimate outrage"); William M.
Kunstler, Open Resistance: In Defense of the Movement, in LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE: ESSAYS TO
DEMYSTIFY LAW, ORDER AND THE COURTS 267, 269 (Robert Lefcourt ed., 1971) (noting the same
New York Times editorial).
230. Jonathan Black, Introduction: A Slight Case of Contempt, in RADICAL LAWYERS: THEIR
ROLE IN THE MOVEMENT AND IN THE COURTS 11, 12 (Jonathan Black ed., 1971); see also Beverly
Axelrod, The Radical Lawyer, in RADICAL LAWYERS: THEIR ROLE IN THE MOVEMENT AND IN THE
COURTS 69, 70 (Jonathan Black ed., 1971) ("[A]s a radical lawyer, I am not concerned with getting
better laws enacted, or improving the legal system-that is meaningless within the context of
American society."); Paul Harris, You Don't Have to Love the Law to Be a Lawyer, in RADICAL
LAWYERS: THEIR ROLE IN THE MOVEMENT AND IN THE COURTS 84, 89 (Jonathan Black ed.,
1971) ("[The law] is society's sophisticated means of restricting people and repressing revolution.");
Henry di Suvero, The Movement and the Legal System, in RADICAL LAWYERS: THEIR ROLE IN THE
MOVEMENT AND IN THE COURTS 51, 57 (jonathan Black ed., 1971) ("There is no such thing as a
radical lawyer in the sense that lawyers working within a legal framework can perform radical
actions."); cf. An Interview with Gerald Lefcourt, in RADICAL LAWYERS: THEIR ROLE IN THE
MOVEMENT AND IN THE COURTS 307, 311 (Jonathan Black ed., 1971) ("Radical lawyers can play
an important role in organizing masses of people."); Ann Fagan Ginger, The Movement and the
Lawyer, 26 GUILD PRAC. 12, 12 (1967) ("A lawyer, then, cannot be an ordinary participant in a
movement."). See generally ANN FAGAN GINGER, THE RELEVANT LAWYERS (1972) (describing
lawyers of the Movement).
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justice offered to preferred customers." 231
For liberals sympathetic to some claims made by members of the New
Left, the system of criminal justice was both inefficient and ineffective. 232
The New York Times published several articles in 1968-1970 by lawyers
critically examining the system of justice. 233  Lewis M. Steel, associate
counsel for the NAACP, argued that "[a] re-evaluation of the role of the
United States Supreme Court discloses that it has struck down only the
symbols of racism while condoning or overlooking the ingrained practices
which have meant the survival of white supremacy. ' 234  Federal Judge J.
Skelly Wright wrote an opinion piece titled The Courts Have Failed the
Poor.2 35 Wright concluded, "In our society, law has worked a hardship on
those least able to withstand it. Rather than helping the poor surmount
their poverty, the law has all too frequently served to perpetuate and even
exacerbated their despair and helplessness."'236  In the aftermath of the
trial of the Panther Nine in New Haven in spring 1970,237 the Magazine
published Can a Black Man Get a Fair Trial in This Country?2 38  The
answer was, "generally NO."2 39
The "Establishment" rejected the view of law and the American legal
system taken by radicals and (some of their) lawyers. 240  The American
Bar Association Journal published several "rule of law" responses. 2 4' A
231. Florynce Kennedy, The Whorehouse Theory of Law, in LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE:
ESSAYS TO DEMYSTIFY LAW, ORDER AND THE COURTS 81, 81 (Robert Lefcourt ed., 1971).
232. This was also the general view of the commissions created by President Johnson. See, e.g.,
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:
THE COURTS 80 (1967) ("There is widespread consciousness of the archaic and inefficient methods
used in many courts to process, schedule, and dispose of their business.").
233. E.g., Haywood Burns, Can a Black Man Get a Fair Trial in This Country?, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., July 12, 1970, at 5 (opining on the inability of black revolutionaries to have a fair trial in the
United States).
234. Lewis M. Steel, A Critic's View of the Warren Court-Nine Men in Black Who Think
White, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 13, 1968, at SM56.
235. J. Skelly Wright, The Courts Have Failed the Poor, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 9, 1969, at
SM26.
236. Id.
237. See LAURA KALMAN, YALE LAW SCHOOL AND THE SIXTIES: REVOLT AND
REVERBERATIONS 203-10 (2005) (recounting the reaction on the Yale campus to the trial of the
Panther Nine).
238. Haywood Burns, Can a Black Man Get a Fair Trial in This Country?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
July 12, 1970, at 5.
239. Id.
240. Eg., William T. Gossett, The Rule of Law or the Defiance of Law?, 55 A.B.A. J. 823, 824
(1969) (criticizing the violent tactics of the radicals and their lawyers).
241. E.g., id at 823 ("[T]he lawful society is not only the best society but the only hope of
mankind; and I can assure you that there remains no higher calling and no higher responsibility than
the devotion of one's life to the sustaining and the advancement of the rule of law.").
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May 1968 article by Sol M. Linowitz raised the stakes: "[O]ur social
institutions are in a critical time of stress, and lawyers owe it to society, no
less than to themselves, to suggest remedies for the future." '24 2 In response
to the student protests at Columbia University, which included occupation
by students of the President's office, a law professor wrote, "We lawyers
have society itself as our client. We should attend to legal-and illegal-
challenges to that society. The violent wing of the New Left is such a
challenge."'24 3  The "violent wing" of the New Left was a challenge to
society in large part because, these lawyers alleged, it rejected the rule of
law. 244 Additional evidence was found in the 1969 ABA President's
address. It was called The Rule of Law or the Defiance of Law?2 45
The ABA upped the ante with an editorial in its June 1970 issue
challenging William Kunstler's approach to legal representation.2 46 The
editorial first reprinted a quote from a profile of Kunstler in the April 19,
1970 edition of the New York Times: "I only defend those whose goal[s] I
share. I'm not a lawyer for hire. I only defend those I love." 24 7
Kunstler's statement contradicted the traditional ideal of the American
legal profession. Working as a "lawyer for hire" was in the best tradition of
the legal profession; an important value lawyers gave their clients was the
critical detachment created by the lawyer's independence from the client.
This was how legal elites justified defending committed Communists
during the 1950s Red Scare. 248  The editorial reiterated this ideal: "Most
lawyers prefer to represent popular causes and prosperous clients, but as a
242. Sol M. Linowitz, Our Changing Society: The Lawyer's Challenge, 54 A.B.A. J. 445, 445
(1968). Linowitz's understanding of the duties and goals of the American legal profession in the early
1960s led him to argue that "lawyers, with unique experience in negotiation, have leading roles to
play in securing world peace and fostering international co-operation." Id. at 447. For a later
assessment of the woes of the American legal profession, see SOL M. LINOWITZ WITH MARTIN
MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(1994).
243. William A. Stanmeyer, The New Left and the Old Law, 55 A.B.A. J. 319, 319 (1969).
244. Id. at 320; see also Robert Ruppin, Professionalism-What Is It?, 55 A.B.A. J. 334, 335
(1969) ("We had better all realize, before it is too late, that the rule of law is the foundation of every
civilized state.").
245. William T. Gossett, The Rule of Law or the Defiance of Law?, 55 A.B.A.J. 823 (1969).
246. Richard Bentley et al., Editorial, A Lawyer for Hire, 56 A.B.A. J. 552, 552 (1970).
247. Victor Navasky, Right On! With Lawyer William Kunstler, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 19,
1970, at 31, 92.
248. See Proceedings of the 1953 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 78 A.B.A. ANN. REP.
118, 133 (1953) (adopting resolution of Special Committee on Individual Rights as Affected by
National Security reaffirming the duty of the bar to represent even the most unpopular defendants);
see also Marshall Bel, Comment, Controlling Lawyers by Bar Associations and Courts, 5 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 301, 330 (1970) (arguing that the 1953 resolution took place only after ABA had
exacerbated the problem of lawyers fading to defend unpopular dients).
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profession and individually we know that our ideal is to provide competent
counsel for any person with a legitimate cause. "249 Thus, "to be a 'lawyer
for hire' is a badge of honor."2 50
This ABA editorial brought a raft of responses. 251 The published letters
to the editors were divided. Some supported the ABA's position,252 while
others criticized it on process grounds,25 3 and still others substantively
defended Kunstler's views.2 54
Such letters suggested a tension in the legal profession beyond the
criticism of Movement lawyers. The divide among lawyers concerned both
the meaning of "law" in a democratic state and the ideal of role morality,
an ideal that a lawyer was more than an agent of a client. 255 Kunstler and
others challenged the view that a lawyer acts in the highest interests of the
calling of the legal profession when representing the legal interests of the
despised. That position was a central aspect of Edward Bennett Williams'
1962 book, One Man' Freedom.
Two weeks before the Kunstler profile, the New York Times published
an article written by Louis Nizer, a lawyer and author of the best seller My
Life in Court,256 criticizing the actions of the Chicago Seven (and their
forebears). 257 Nizer denied their trial or the more recent "Panther 21"
249. Richard Bentley et al., Editorial, A Lawyer for Hire, 56 A.B.A. J. 552, 552 (1970).
250. Id. The Navasky profile of Kunstler made a brief mention of this distinction. Kunstler,
unlike Edward Bennett Williams and others who adopted the "classic lawyer's position," did not
believe in the ideal of the independent lawyer, but in identifying wholly with the client. See Victor
Navasky, Right On! With Lawyer William Kunstler, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 19, 1970 at 31, 93
(advocating a position that in politically-motivated prosecutions, the lawyer becomes the political
agent of the client).
251. Views of Our Readers, Kunstler and the Lawyer's Role, 56 A.BA. J. 716 (1970).
252. See Letter from Dave Freeman, Views of Our Readers, Kunstler and the Lawyer's Role, 56
A.B.A. J. 716, 716 (1970) (labeling Kunsder an "antiethical, misguided champion of disorder,
confusion and waste").
253. See Letter from Robert A. Mendelson, Views of Our Readers, Kunstler and the Lawyer's
Role, 56 A.B.A. J. 716, 716 (1970) (calling criticism "unjustified" on grounds that the profession is
"intellectual enough to be tolerant of various viewpoints of the basis upon which an attorney may
practice").
254. See Letter from Harold Weiner, Views of Our Readers, Kunstler and the Lawyers Role, 56
A.B.A. J. 716, 722 (1970) ("Perhaps this society would be a lot better off if lawyers developed the
same social conscience that befits members of a more rational lay society and worried more about the
public good they are supposed to represent, rather than the selfish immediate interest of whoever pays
the biggest fee.").
255. See generally Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem,
and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613 (opining on the challenges posed by the
traditional model of an independent lawyer).
256. EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS, ONE MAN'S FREEDOM (1962).
257. Louis Nizer, What to Do When the Judge Is Put Up Against the Wall, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Apr. 5, 1970, at 30.
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case 258 was "political," and offered five suggestions on ensuring that the
"exquisite machinery" of the trial would not be harmed by the "new assault
upon it."2 5 9  Nizer suggested the court be permitted in certain
circumstances to remove from the courtroom the defendant, the defense
attorney, or members of the audience, and to enhance punishments of
lawyers who deliberately interfered with the process of the trial through
disbarment or other punishment. He also suggested making such attorney
conduct a felony of obstruction of justice.26 ° In Summer 1970, the
American College of Trial Lawyers adopted twelve Principles As to
Disruption of the Judicial Process.26 1  The Committee drafting these
principles included notable lawyers such as Simon Rifkind,2 62 Whitney
North Seymour,2 63 and Edward Bennett Williams. Like Nizer's proposal,
the Trial Lawyers argued that decorum was important not for its own sake,
but was essential to a fair trial: "The dignity, decorum and courtesy which
have traditionally characterized the courts of civilized nations are not
empty formalities. They are essential to an atmosphere in which justice
can be done." 26 4  Their principles were intended to ensure that the
criminal accused received a fair trial, the sine qua non of legal process.
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York (ABCNY)
sponsored an annual Benjamin N. Cardozo lecture. Edward Levi,2 65 then
258. See generally Statement to Judge Murtagh, in RADICAL LAWYERS: THEIR ROLE IN THE
MOVEMENT AND IN THE COURTS 122 (Jonathan Black ed., 1971); The Panther 21: To Judge
Murtagh, in LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE: ESSAYS TO DEMYSTIFY LAW, ORDER AND THE COURTS
185 (Robert Lefcourt ed., 1971). This was a statement by the defendants in response to the court's
order of an indefinite recess of pretrial proceedings.
259. Louis Nizer, What to Do When the Judge Is Put Up Against the Wall, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Apr. 5, 1970, at 126.
260. Id. at 128.
261. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON DISRUPTION
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1970). Future Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. served as an
ex officio member.
262. See generally Leslie Gorgon Fagen, Rifkind, Simon H., in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 459 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009).
263. See generally Conrad K. Harper, Seymour, Whitney North, in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 490 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009). Seymour was "widely
respected as one of America's foremost trial and appellate lawyers." Id. He led many organizations,
including serving as President of the American Bar Association, the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, the American College of Trial Lawyers, and on the boards of the ACLU and as co-
chairman of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. Id. at 491.
264. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON DISRUPTION
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 4 (1970).
265. See generally Mark L. Wolf, Levi, Edward H., in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN LAW 331 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009); Gerhard Casper, For Edward Levi, 52 U. CHI.
L. REV. 281 (1985) (tracing the legal career of Edward Levi).
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President of the University of Chicago, titled his November 1969 lecture
The Crisis in the Nature of Law.26 6 This crisis existed in part because the
enforcement of segregation after the abolition of slavery called into
question "the purpose and integrity of law."' 267  Further, "an unpopular,
undeclared war, using the coercion of government to force service in that
war, dramatized the violence which government can command."'2 68  The
times, then, "tests what law has to offer." 26 9  Levi spoke of the
fundamental interest of society in the legal process, particularly the
criminal trial process, which tests "society's restraint against its own
deception, coercion, or unequal treatment of persons."' 270  Commenting
obliquely on the ongoing Chicago Seven trial, Levi rejected the notion of
the criminal defendant as "victim," the tendency to "make all trials in some
sense potentially political," and the overuse of conspiracy charges to
"impose accountability" on the defendants. 271  Lawyers needed to
acknowledge this crisis of law, and were best placed to respond to it. To
overcome the crisis, it was essential that "independent" lawyers join
together "in the science and practice of a discipline central to our culture
and to our freedom." 27 2
To celebrate its centennial anniversary the following year, the ABCNY
arranged a symposium. The ABCNY accepted the foundational "belief of
lawyers in the vibrancy of law."' 273  This belief, wrote Whitney North
Seymour-a paragon of the legal establishment 2 7 4-was challenged "all
over America, from many sources."'2 75 The ABCNY agreed it "should ask
itself whether its premise, faith in law and in the value of trying to mold it
266. EDWARD H. LEvI, THE CRISIS IN THE NATURE OF LAW (1970).
267. Id. at 19.
268. Id. at 20.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 24.
271. Id. at 25. On personal accountability, Levi wrote, "The least persuasive way to make this
point is through a conspiracy case. The conspiracy charge carries the disability of obscuring
individual action." Id.
272. Id. at 28.
273. Whitney North Seymour, Foreword to Is LAW DEAD? 7, 7 (Eugene V. Rostow ed., 1971).
274. Seymour "was widely respected as one of America's foremost trial and appellate lawyers."
Conrad K. Harper, Seymour, Whitney North, in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
LAW 490, 490 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009). He led many organizations, including serving as
President of the American Bar Association, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the
American College of Trial Lawyers, and he served on the board of the ACLU and was co-chairman of
the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. Id. at 491.
275. Whitney North Seymour, Foreword to IS LAW DEAD? 7, 7 (Eugene V. Rostow ed., 1971);
see also Robert Paul Wolff, Introduction to THE RULE OF LAW 7, 8 (Robert Paul Wolff ed., 1971)
(noting "the attacks on political authority have more and more come to be focused on the institutions
of the law," a reflection of more generalized attacks on all kinds of authority).
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and its institutions to fit the needs of a changing society, was still
valid."2 76 The cheeky but illustrative title of its symposium was, Is Law
Dead2 7 7
The ABCNY invited Eugene V. Rostow, 278 former Dean of Yale Law
School, to organize the symposium. Rostow contributed an introduction
and an essay largely rejecting civil disobedience in American society in the
ensuing book on the symposium topic.27 9  Though some contributors
challenged the ABCNY's faith in law, a majority offered a defense of
fidelity to the ideal of law as binding a democratic society.
28 0
The Association held this symposium on April 30 and May 1, 1970, the
latter of which was, of course, Law Day.281  The symbolism was apparent
to the ABCNY. As members of this elite bar association gathered to listen
to the symposium speakers, other lawyers joined in public protest of the
"Amerikan" legal system. 282 This protest was a direct attack on the
premise of Law Day, and had begun a year earlier in New York's Foley
Square, where the federal courthouse for the Southern District of New
York was located: "The [April 30, 1969] demonstration was aimed at
countering the platitudes about this 'reaffirmation' of the concept of
justice."'28 3 A supporter of the protests claimed the gathering totaled 500
lawyers and law students. 28 4 "Despite the failure of the mass media to
publicize" the protests by lawyers, or their demands for legal reforms,
demonstrations spread to eight cities during the next year, with a particular
focus on the trial of the Chicago Eight.28 5 By Law Day 1971, "over two
276. Whitney North Seymour, Foreword to IS LAW DEAD? 7,7 (Eugene V. Rostowed., 1971).
277. Id. at 8.
278. On Rostow's early deanship at Yale, see LAURA KALMAN, YALE LAW SCHOOL AND THE
SIXTIES: REVOLT AND REVERBERATIONS 47-50 (2005). On Rostow generally, see Geoffrey
Kabaservice, Rostow, Eugene V., in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 469
(Roger K. Newman ed., 2009).
279. See Eugene V. Rostow, The Rightful Limits of Freedom in a Liberal Democratic State: Of
Civil Disobedience, in IS LAW DEAD? 39, 45 (Eugene V. Rostow ed., 1971) ("It is the thesis of this
paper that our society-as a society of consent-should not and indeed cannot acknowledge a right
of civil disobedience ....").
280. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON DISRUPTION
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1970).
281. Id.
282. Gerald B. Lefcourt, The Radical Lauyer Under Attack, in LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE:
ESSAYS TO DEMYSTIFY LAW, ORDER AND THE COURTS 253, 254 (Robert Lefcourt ed., 1971).
283. Id.
284. Id. A law professor wrote, "185 young lawyers picketed outside a New York criminal
court demanding reforms in the court system" on May 1, 1969. Donald T. Weckstein, Maintaining
the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession, 48 TEX. L. REV. 267, 267 (1970).
285. Gerald B. Lefcourt, The Radical Lawyer Under Attack, in LAw AGAINST THE PEOPLE:
ESSAYS TO DEMYSTIFY LAW, ORDER AND THE COURTS 253, 258 (Robert Lefcourt ed., 1971).
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thousand lawyers amassed again in New York, protesting the war and
others also demanding changes in the legal system."
28 6
D. The Interested Legal Profession
In fall 1973, "for the first time ever, there was not a single 'unfilled seat'
in the first-year class of any approved law school."' 28 7  That year also
marked the second consecutive year that overall law school enrollment in
ABA-approved schools exceeded 100,000, and was a third straight year of
double-digit law student population growth.28 8  The number of law
students in ABA-approved law schools grew from 101,664 in 1972 to a
peak of 122,860 in 1979, more than twice the number in 1964.289 The
number of lawyers rose from 355,242 in 1970 to 542,205 in 1980, a 53%
increase.290 Early in 1972, the ABA created a Task Force on Professional
Utilization to alleviate the concerns of lawyers regarding "the increase in
the number of new entrants into the profession."' 29 1 Business Week piled
on, concluding "the outlook for lawyers [was] grim."2 9 2
During the 1970s lawyer income dropped. Separate studies of lawyer
income in Michigan, Maryland, and Illinois in different periods during
this decade all found a decline in lawyer income, adjusting for inflation.29 3
Richard Posner concluded, "[T]he price of legal services fell (in real, that
is, inflation-adjusted, terms), rather than ... rose[] between 1970 and
1985. " 294 Sander and Williams provided the best evidence of the
economic straits in the legal profession of the 1970s: In constant 1983
286. Id. at 259.
287. James P. White, Is That Burgeoning Law School Enrollment Ending?, 61 A.B.A.J. 202, 202
(1975). White, the ABA consultant on legal education noted, "In 1974 only one law school reported
'unfilled seats' in its entering class." Id.
288. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 279 tbl.21 (1989).
289. See id. (listing 59,813 law students in 1964).
290. See THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE U.S. LEGAL
PROFESSION IN THE 1980S, at 4 (Barbara A. Curran et al. eds., 1985) (noting number of lawyers in
Table 1.1.1); see also RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 280 (1989) (displaying these
statistics). Beginning with the 1988 Supplement to the Lawyer Statistical Report and continuing
through the 2005 Report, it has listed 355,242 for 1971 rather than 1970. See SUPPLEMENT TO
THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 1988, at I (Barbara A.
Curran & Clara N. Carson eds., 1991) (presenting lawyer employment statistics); THE LAWYER
STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 2005, at 2 tbl. 1 (Clara N. Carson with
Jeeyoon Park eds., 2012) (charting the growth of the legal profession).
291. See Report of the Task Force on Professional Utilization, 97 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 818, 819
(1972) (quoting the charge of ABA Governors to the Task Force).
292. Special Report, The Job Gap for College Graduates in the "70s, BUS. WK., Sept. 23, 1972, at
48, 51.
293. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 160 (1989).
294. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 67 (1996).
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dollars, the median income of lawyers in 1969 was $47,638.295 In 1979,
lawyer median income had declined to $36,716.296 Instead of earning
1.85 times the income of the median American worker, the lawyer at the
median level of lawyer income now earned 1.35 times the median income
worker, a significant loss of earning power in just one decade.297
Though many lawyers suffered economically during the 1970s, some
lawyers did quite well. Sander and Williams looked at total law firm
receipts in five-year increments beginning in 1967 and ending in 1982.298
In 1972, law firm receipts from individuals totaled 52.5%. By 1982, that
percentage was 44.5%.299 Receipts from businesses accounted for three-
quarters of this change, which went from 42.3% of all receipts in 1972 to
48.6% in 1982.300 This shift disproportionately benefitted large law
firms. 3 0 1
Another group that did well during the 1970s was a subset of plaintiffs'
personal injury lawyers. Melvin Belli helped found in 1946 the National
Association of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys (NACCA).3 ° 2 Its
membership nearly doubled between 1964, when the successor to NACCA
changed its name to the American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA), and
1967.303 Some personal injury lawyers did very well from the 1960s on.
The Inner Circle of Advocates was created in 1972, and initially limited
membership to fifty lawyers who had tried at least fifty personal injury
cases and had achieved at least one verdict of $1 million or more.30 4
American lawyers also faced a number of perceived threats to their
economic well-being from the government. In 1974, the Department of
Justice sued the ABA alleging several antitrust violations in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. 30 5  A subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
295. Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams, Why Are There So Many Lawyers? Perspectives
on a Turbulent Market, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 431, 448 tbl.9 (1989).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 4 4 9 tbl.10.
298. Id. at 441 tbl.5.
299. Id.
300. Id
301. See id. at 431, 441 (asserting large firms, catering to large businesses, grew faster than
small firms, which were oriented to serve individuals).
302. MARION A. ELIS & HOWARD E. COVINGTON, JR., SAGES OF THEIR CRAFT: THE
FIRST FIFTY YEARS OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS 65 (2000).
303. Id.
304. See The History of the Inner Circle of Advocates, INNER CIRCLE OF ADVOCS.,
http://www.innercircle.org/history (last visited Aug. 29, 2014.
305. See Justice Department and Other Views on Prepaid Legal Services Plans Get an Airing Before
the Tunney Subcommittee, 60 A.B.A. J. 791, 792-93 (1974) (statement of Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy
Assistant Att'y Gen.).
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Committee held hearings at the February 1974 Midyear Meeting of the
ABA on a topic entitled, The Organized Bar: Self-Serving or Serving the
Public?306 The next year, the Supreme Court held that bar association
minimum fee schedules violated federal anti-trust law. 30 7  The
Department of Justice then filed a second antitrust complaint against the
ABA, this time over its ban on lawyer advertisements. 30 8 In the 1977 case
of Bates v. State Bar,3 ° 9 the Supreme Court held the absolute ban on
lawyer advertising adopted in the Code and made law by most states,
violated the First Amendment. 3 10  At the end of the year, the Federal
Trade Commission publicly announced its investigation of the American
legal profession. 31 1
The standing of lawyers also tumbled. A Harris Poll in 1973 found that
just 24% of the public had confidence in lawyers. 3 12 A 1976 Gallup Poll
found that just 25% of the public believed lawyers rated very high or high
in their "honesty and ethical standards. ''3 13  Even a critic of American
lawyers, writing in 1977, seemed somewhat sympathetic: "Since 1973,
American lawyers have taken an awful beating."'3 14  Overshadowing all of
these events was the Watergate scandal. 3 15
306. The Organized Bar: Self-Serving or Serving the Public?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Representation of Citizen Interests of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. (1974).
307. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 773, 784 (1975).
308. See Lawrence E. Walsh, The Annual Report of the President of the American Bar Association,
62 A.B.A. J. 1119, 1120 (1976) (reporting filing of the second complaint).
309. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
310. See id. at 384 (holding the Arizona Bar's absolute ban on truthful legal advertising violated
the First Amendment).
311. See F.T C. Goes Public on Lawyer Probe, 64 A.B.A. J. 959, 959 (1978) (reporting on
disclosures by the FTC of an effort to regulate the legal profession nationwide).
312. Michael Asimow, Lawyers, Popular Perception of in OXFORD COMPANION TO
AMERICAN LAw 495, 495 (Kermit. L. Hall et al., eds., 2002); see also The Organized Bar: Self-Serving
or Serving the Public?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 7 (1974) (statement by Sen. Tunney) (noting that attorney's
approval rating still beat Congress, which had an 18% confidence mark).
313. Honesty/Ethics in Professions, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1654/honesty-ethics-
professions.aspx#3 (last visited Aug. 29, 2014).
314. JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 35 (1978).
315. See id. at 35-40 (discussing how Watergate placed the ethics and image of attorneys under
intense scrutiny from those both inside and outside the legal profession.); see also Michael Asimow,
Lawyers, Popular Perceptions of in OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 495, 496 (Kermit. L.
Hall et al., eds., 2002) ("Many people think the decline in public esteem for the profession began
with the Watergate scandal in 1973.").
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E. Watergate
Senator Talmadge. Now, will you look at exhibit No. 34-47* that you
inserted in your testimony yesterday. It is also an interesting document. As
I recall your testimony as you presented that yesterday, it is a list of all of the
people that you thought had violated the law and what the laws may be that
they violated, is that correct?"
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Talmadge. Let us start with the top of the list, now. That is in
your own handwriting, is it not?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Talmadge. This is a copy thereof?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Talmadge. What is the significance of the letters in the top
lefthand part of that sheet?
Mr. Dean. The list is broken down into two parts, Senator. One says
"pre" and the other is "post."
Senator Talmadge. By "pre," you mean prior to the Watergate break-in?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Talmadge. The planning and discussion of those events?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Talmadge. And you list in that category Mr. Mitchell, Mr.
Magruder, and Mr. Strachan, is that correct?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Talmadge. Now, you have a star by Mr. Mitchell's name and no
star by Mr. Magruder.
Mr. Dean. Maybe if I explain the whole list, it would save some questions
for you.
Senator Talmadge. Surely.
Mr. Dean. I have listed for pre: Mitchell, Magruder, Strachan; post:
Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Dean, LaRue, Mardian, O'Brien, Parkinson,
Colson, Bittman, Kalmbach, Tony-I have by that the word "source." I will
explain that in a minute; Stans.
Now, beside several of the names, after I did the list-just my first reaction
was there certainly are an awful lot of lawyers involved here. So I put a little
asterisk beside each lawyer, which was Mitchell, Strachan, Ehrlichman,
Dean, Mardian, O'Brien, Parkinson, Colson, Bittman, and Kalmbach.
Then I put, as we were discussing the development of the list, the evidence
that I knew sort of firsthand or had reason to believe that others had
firsthand evidence of, that I thought that a very strong case might be made
against. The ones that I was not as sure about were those I put a question[ ]
mark on. This was just something I was working out in my own mind in a
discussion I had with my lawyer as a result of discussions he had also had
with some of the prosecutors.
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Senator Talmadge. Any significance to the star? That they are all lawyers?
Mr. Dean. No, that was just a reaction myself, the fact that how in God's
name could so many lawyers get involved in something like this?
3 16
The transcript does not mark the audience reaction to this exchange
during the Watergate hearings between disgraced White House counsel
John Dean and Georgia Senator Herman Talmadge in summer 1973. A
recent history of the era notes that, when Dean stated each person with an
asterisk next to his name was a lawyer, the audience laughed. 3 17 It may
have laughed because, as an ABA President admitted, "[e]arly in its
development Watergate was characterized as a lawyer's scandal." 3 18
The final report of the National Organization of Bar Counsel listed
twenty-nine lawyers involved in Watergate-related bar disciplinary matters,
of whom twenty-seven were also criminal defendants or unindicted co-
conspirators. 3 19  Seven were disbarred, and eleven others, including the
two not indicted or listed as unindicted co-conspirators, were publicly
disciplined. 32 0
Lawyers expressed both regret and defensiveness regarding the scandal,
and sometimes both. 321  ABA President Robert Meserve, writing in the
middle of the scandal, noted both the "painful fact" that so many involved
in Watergate were lawyers, but also that "lawyers are the single largest
316. Watergate and Related Activities Phase T Watergate Investigation: Hearings Before the Select
Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities of the U.S. Senate, 93d Cong. 1053-54 (1973).
Document 34-47, about which Dean and Talmadge were speaking, is reprinted at 1312. Parts of this
exchange are reprinted in MARION A. ELLIS & HOWARD E. COVINGTON, JR., SAGES OF THEIR
CRAFT 123 (2000), Kathleen Clark, The Legacy of Watergate for Legal Ethics Instruction, 51
HASTINGS L.J. 673, 673 (2000), and Donald T. Weckstein, Watergate and the Law Schools, 12 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 261, 261 (1975). See James F. Bresnahan & John L. Kane, Professional Ethics and
Competence in Trial Practice, 62 A.B.A. J. 988, 989 (1976) (noting Dean's testimony on this issue
was "[o]ne of the more poignant moments" of the Watergate hearings).
317. RICK PERLSTEIN, THE INVISIBLE BRIDGE: THE FALL OF NIXON AND THE RISE OF
REAGAN 140 (2014).
318. James D. Fellers, President's Page, 61 A.B.A. J. 529, 529 (1975).
319. N. O.t. C. Reports on Results of Watergate-Related Charges Against Twenty-nine Lawyers, 62
A.B.A. J. 1337, 1337 (1976). Other critics provide a more caustic view. See Jerold S. Auerbach, The
Legal Profession After Watergate, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1287, 1287 (1976) ("The law-enforcers, lawyers
all, were the law-breakers.").
320. N. O.B. C. Reports on Results of Watergate-Related Charges Against Twenty-nine Lawyers, 62
A.B.A. J. 1337, 1337 (1976); see also Kathleen Clark, The Legacy of Watergate for Legal Ethics
Instruction, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 673, 678-679 (1999) (noting discipline of sixteen lawyers, not
including the two lawyers not indicted or listed as unindicted co-conspirators).
321. See Robert W. Meserve, Our Profession & Watergate, 2 STUDENT LAW. 9, 10 (1973-74)
("[W]e must, of course, be extremely careful in separating what has been or will be proved from what
has been alleged and is only speculation.").
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occupational group in government, particularly at the federal level."'322 In
a similar vein at the same time, Leroy Jeffers, President of the State Bar of
Texas, wrote: "The American lawyer is under attack and the most
cherished values he defends are under siege by his enemies .... [Lawyers]
must sharply reject the frequent glib and shallow assertion that Watergate
tarnishes the Bar and brings it into disrepute."' 323  But reinforcing legal
ethics training became a mantra in the ABA. Mere days after Richard
Nixon resigned in August 1974, the ABA's House of Delegates approved a
proposal making mandatory the teaching of professional responsibility in
any ABA-approved law school. 324
By mid-1975, initial calls arose to amend the Code of Professional
Responsibility in light of Watergate. 325 Those calls then came more
frequently. 326  One critic declared the Code was a "monument to the
profession's imagined self-interest." 32 7 Eric Schnapper represented the
pessimism of some, calling the Code "a treasure trove of moral
platitudes."'328 In the May 1977 issue of the ABA Journal, Emory Law
School Dean L. Ray Patterson wrote an article urging replacement of the
Code.32 9 He opened with a startling argument: "[The time] has come to
renounce completely the fiction that ethical problems for lawyers are
matters of ethics rather than law. ' 330  Patterson laid it on thick, arguing
322. Robert W. Meserve, President's Page, 59 A.B.A. J. 681, 681 (1973); see also Robert W.
Meserve, Our Profession & Watergate, 2 STUDENT LAW. 9, 11 (1973) ("[L]awyers are more involved
in government than any other professional group.").
323. Leroy Jeffers, A Word of Prid, 36 TEX. B.J. 763, 763 (1973).
324. See Charles D. Kelso, Report of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, 99
A.B.A. ANN. REP. 1104, 1107 (1974) (describing the proposal). See generally Michael Ariens, The
Ethics of Copyrighting Ethics Rules, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 235, 246-47 (2005) (explaining the history
behind the law school ethics course requirement).
325. See Abner J. Mikva, Ethics and Lawyers: No Time for Recession, 1 B. LEADER 2, 3 (1975)
(" [We must strengthen the Code of Professional Responsibility so that it contains provisions dealing
with the conduct of lawyers in government service.").
326. See, e.g., William B. Spann, Jr., The Legal Profession Needs a New Code of Ethics, 3 B.
LEADER 2, 2-3 (1977) (suggesting Watergate and contemporary corporate bribery scandals demand a
review of the Code of Professional Responsibility).
327. Jay M. Smyser, In-House Corporate Counsel: The Erosion of Independence, in VERDICTS ON
LAWYERS 208, 215 (Ralph Nader & Mark Green eds., 1976); see also JEROLD S. AUERBACH,
UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 288 (1977) ("Like the
Canons it replaced, [the Code] concentrated its energies upon the preservation of a professional
monopoly, not the provision of legal services."); JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 65
(1978) (observing that though the "new code is more subtle [and] more modern" than the Canons,
"the code remains confusing, ambiguous, and inconsistent").
328. Eric Schnapper, The Myth of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A.J. 202, 203 (1978).
329. L. Ray Patterson, Wanted: A New Code of Professional Responsibility, 63 A.B.A. J. 639
(1977).
330. Id. at 639.
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that the Code suffered "from a defect common to the adolescent stage of
growth," claiming that is was "rigid and simplistic, complex and
contradictory, and matters of ethics rather than law."' 33 1 Patterson's three
justifications for a new Code reflected the varying interests of American
lawyers. First, the lawyer was "more than an advocate serving the interests
of a client, ''3 3 2 a view that reflected those engaged in public interest work.
Second, the overarching duties of a lawyer were threefold, incorporating
"loyalty, candor, and fairness," 33 3 a view championed by those who
promoted the idea of the lawyer as facilitator of the client's interests.
Third, the lawyer's legal duties depended on (1) "the particular role of the
lawyer," (2) "the process of law administration in which the lawyer is
engaged," and (3) "the rights and duties of the client."334  This
justification broadly encompassed the criticisms of counselors in business
matters33 5 as well as those advocating more zealous representation of the
criminally accused. 336
Patterson either struck an institutional nerve, or spoke as a de facto
representative of the ABA, for the ABA Board of Governors publicly noted
the creation of a nine-person special committee to review the Code at its
annual meeting two months later.337 ABA President William B. Spann,
Jr., urged the committee to assess "all facets of legal ethics."' 338 Patterson
was initially appointed the special committee's reporter, and later served as
its consultant. 33 9 The special committee was headed by Omaha lawyer
331. Id.
332. Id. at 639-40.
333. Id; see also L. Ray Patterson, A Preliminary Rationalization of the Law of Legal Ethics, 57
N.C. L. REV. 519, 528 (1979) (detailing the principles of conduct a lawyer must abide by, which
include loyalty, candor and fairness).
334. L. Ray Patterson, Wanted: A New Code of Professional Responsibility, 63 A.B.A. J. 639, 640
(1977).
335. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 7 (1978) (noting that
lawyers at 1976 conference regarding Code concluded, among other things, that Code "does not deal
directly with the lawyer's role when he acts otherwise than as an advocate").
336. See generally Michael Ariens, Brougham's Ghost, 35 N. ILL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015)
(detailing efforts in the 1960s and 1970s to inculcate a model of zealous representation).
337. See Report of the Board of Governors to the House of Delegates, 102 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 575,
581 (1977) ("A nine-member Special Committee was created to study further enlargement and
review of the Code of Professional Responsibility .... ).
338. William B. Spann, Jr., The Legal Profession Needs a New Code of Ethics, 3 B. LEADER 2, 3
(1977).
339. See SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF PROF'L STANDARDS, A.B.A., COMMISSION
ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS JOURNALS, Sept. 1977-Aug. 1979, at Aspen,
Colo., 1 (Sept. 29, 1977) (on file at Yale Law School) (naming Patterson as reporter at the first
meeting of the Special Committee held in Aspen in September 1977). Patterson later was listed as
consultant upon publication of the January 1980 Discussion Draft. See generally MODEL RULES OF
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Robert Kutak, and became known as the Kutak Commission. 340
IV. CRISIS AND THE MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION
A. End and Beginning
The May 1979 issue of the North Carolina Law Review published papers
from a symposium, the purpose of which was to aid revision of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. 34 1  John Sutton, the reporter for the
Wright Committee that drafted the Code, candidly explained that the
Code was readily adopted "in no small part to its generally conservative
approach." 342 That approach, given extensive changes in the practice of
law and an insufficiently refined "philosophy underlying certain
disciplinary rules and ethical considerations" generated "additional
difficulties ... and vexing questions" regarding interpretation of the
Code.343 Sutton championed a broad-ranging reform of the Code, but
wished to continue the use of all three standards set forth in the Code:
"regulatory laws, standards of recommended normal professional practices,
and ethical norms of aspirations and professional objectives." 344
The approach taken by the Kutak Commission was quite different. The
June, 1979 issue of the ABA Journal included a brief item indicating the
Kutak Commission's plan to dramatically restructure the Code: "As now
envisioned, the [C]ode would abandon the format of canons, ethical
considerations and disciplinary rules, substituting the more prevalent ABA
approach of black[]letter rules with commentary."'34 5 The Commission
planned to issue a preliminary draft in February 1980, and the story noted
a debate on the proposed code would occur at the ABA's August 1979
Annual Meeting.346 Finally, the report indicated the Commission's
timeline. The preliminary draft was to be followed by a final draft in
August 1980, and the ABA's House of Delegates was to discuss and
PROF'L CONDUCT preface (Discussion Draft 1980) (discussing the growth and publication of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
340. Michael Ariens, The Ethics of Copyrighting Ethics Rules, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 235, 254
(2005).
341. Symposium, Reflections on a Decade Under the Code of Professional Responsibility: The Need
for Reform, 57 N.C. L. REV. 497 (1979).
342. John F. Sutton, Jr., How Vulnerable Is the Code of Professional Responsibility?, 57 N.C. L.
REV. 497, 497 (1979).
343. Id. at 499.
344. Id. at 517.
345. Commission Bites Bullet on Ethics Code Issues, 65 A.B.A. J. 887, 887 (1979); Report of the
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, 104 A.B-A. ANN. REP. 1010, 1010 (1979).
346. Commission Bites Bullet on Ethics Code Issues, 65 A.B.A. J. 887, 888 (1979).
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consider adoption of the Code in February 1981 .14 This was not to be
the case. 348
Evidence that adoption of a new code of ethics might not be easy arose
during and after the August 1979 debate on the structure and content of a
code of legal ethics. 34 9  Like the Wright Committee before it, the Kutak
Commission had met privately during its two-year existence.3 50  Unlike
the Wright Committee, the post-Watergate press viewed the Kutak
Commission's secretiveness with suspicion. 35 1 The National Law Journal
reported from the August 1979 ABA Annual Meeting, "Mr. Kutak
circulated copies of the draft privately, but continued to hide it from
reporters. 'What are we, the great unwashed?' one asked him."352 At the
debate, Professor Monroe Freedman called the working draft a "failure" 353
and its provisions on exceptions to the protection of client confidences
"radical and radically wrong."'3 54  This private "working draft," dated
August 2, 1979, was leaked and published in the August 13, 1979 issue of
the Daily Report for Executives,3 55 as well as in the August 27, 1979 issue
of Legal Times, a District of Columbia law weekly. 3 56  Almost
immediately after the debate, ATLA declared its intention to draft a code
of ethics "independent of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility."'357  When the ABA released its Discussion Draft five
347. Id.
348. See Michael Ariens, The Ethics of Copyrighting Ethics Rules, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 235, 241
(2005) (explaining why adoption of the Code occurred in 1983).
349. See Robert J. Kutak, Evaluating the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 1980
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1016, 1016 (recounting the volumes of comment received following the
release of the draft Rules).
350. See, e.g., SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF PROF'L STANDARDS, A.B.A.,
COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS JOURNALS, Sept. 1977-Aug. 1979,
at Aspen, Colo., 1 (Sept. 29, 1977). The bound copy used for this Article is located at Yale Law
School. It has no publication date, and likely was given to the library by Geoffrey Hazard, who was a
member of the Yale Law School faculty when he served as Reporter for the Model Rules.
351. See The Ethics of Secrecy, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 3, 1979, at 16 (quoting a reporter's objection to
the secrecy surrounding circulation of the draft Rules).
352. Id.
353. Laura Kiernan, ABA Keeps Ethics Code Under Wraps in Dallas, WASH. POST, Aug. 12,
1979.
354. Jonathan M. Winer, Ethics Draft Ignites Uproar, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 27, 1979, at 1.
355. See Mark H. Aultman, Legal Fiction Becomes Legal Fantasy, 7 J. LEGAL PROF. 31, 39
(1982) (stating a "working draft" was "to be reviewed by a select few" but was published by the
Bureau of National Affairs' Daily Report for Executives).
356. See The Record: Text of Initial Draft of Ethics Code Rewrite Committee, LEGAL TIMES, Aug.
27, 1979, at 26.
357. Trial Lawyers Group Parts Company with ABA on Ethics Code, Specialization, 65 A.B.A. J.
1299, 1299 (1979); see also Jonathan M. Winer, Ethics Draft Ignites Uproar, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 27,
1979, at 1 (declaring that the ATLA's decision to draft a competing code was based largely on the
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months later,3 58 the Kutak Commission demonstrated its desire to leave
the Code behind: "The Commission determined that a comprehensive
reformulation was required. We have built on the Code's foundation, but
we make no apology for having pushed beyond it."'3 5 9 True to its word,
the ABA had drafted rules regarding client confidences that made the
lawyer more than the mouthpiece of the client,3 60 crafting two sets of
exceptions to the duty of confidentiality. 36 1  The calibrated rule and its
exceptions failed to satisfy either the left or the right.36 2 With Freedman
serving as Reporter, the Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers
Foundation issued its own draft Code of Conduct, which departed from
the ABA Discussion Draft and rejected most exceptions to the duty of
client confidentiality. 36 3
The Discussion Draft consciously avoided using the words "zeal" or
"zealous" in reference to client representation, 36 4 included a mandatory
pro bono requirement, 36 5 and organized several chapters based on the
differing roles lawyers undertook when representing clients. The
Discussion Draft found, at best, "mixed" support. 366  This may have
surprised the Commission, which spoke in authoritative terms in the
Preface to the Discussion Draft:
Kutak Commission's leisurely pace).
358. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT preface (Discussion Draft 1980).
359. Id.
360. Id. R 1.7 cmt.
361. Id. R. 1.7(b), (c). See generally Michael Ariens, "Playing Chicken ": An Instant History of the
Battle over Exceptions to Client Confidences, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 239, 257-258 (2009) (discussing the
history of the approach taken in the Discussion Draft regarding exceptions to client confidences).
362. See id. at 258 (providing examples of negative reaction to the proposed Rule 1.7).
363. Commission on Professional Responsibility of the Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyer's
Foundation, The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct Public Discussion Drafi-June 1980, TRIAL, Aug.
1980, at 44, 50.
364. See COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS JOURNALS, Feb. 23-
24, 1979 (Research Triangle Park, North Carolina) 19-20 (n.d.) (copy on file with author)
("'Zealous,' it seems, has curiously come to mean 'overzealous.' Strong sentiment was found around
the table for dropping 'zeal' altogether as a descriptive term with ethical consequences. It carries with
it simply too much baggage.").
365. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.1 (Discussion Draft 1980) ("A lawyer
shall render unpaid public interest legal service.").
366. See James Lindgren, The Model Rules: A Foreword, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 923,
924-25 (reciting that amongst eight reviewers consulted, none found the Model Rules an unqualified
success, nor did they find it an unqualified disaster). This mixed support is demonstrated in the
compilation of comments sent to Reporter Geoffrey Hazard. The comments were later bound and
consist of four volumes totaling hundreds of pages. See COMPILATION OF COMMENTS ON THE
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (4 vols. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., comp. 1980) (copy
on file with author).
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What follows, then, is the distillation of two and one-half years of rethinking
the fundamental tenets of ethics and self-regulation in the legal profession.
That process has resulted in what we believe is a fundamental clarification of
the ethical judgments lawyers must daily make in the practice of law. 3 6 7
In response to criticisms, Robert Kutak was much more circumspect
about the "distillation" of "rethinking the fundamental tenets of
ethics."'3 68  He observed that this "draft is not a final draft, nor even a
tentative one, but a Discussion Draft."369  "[T]he proposed Rules are a
series of ideas meriting discussion, not fixed positions that we are prepared
to aggressively defend." 3 70
The Kutak Commission issued its Proposed Final Draft on May 30,
1981.371 The rules and exceptions on client confidentiality had been
greatly rewritten,3 72 and the provision on mandatory pro bono was
jettisoned.3 73 After another year, the ABA published the Final Draft of
the Model Rules. 374
At the 1982 Annual Meeting, the ABA's House of Delegates began its
discussion of the "more important and controversial rules."'375  In
introducing the proposed Model Rules, Robert Kutak told the Delegates
that the revised final draft was "not an attack on the adversary system, did
not turn the focus of law practice away from clients toward outsiders, and
did not impose sweeping changes in the lawyer's traditional role."37 6 The
debate began regarding Rule 1.5, which concerned fees and fee
367. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT preface (Discussion Draft 1980).
368. See Robert J. Kutak, Evaluating the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 1980
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1016, 1018 ("After 11 years of experience, we better understand the difficulty
and uncertainty of attempting to legislate normative values at two levels-aspiration and minimum
conduct.").
369. Id. at 1016.
370. Id.
371. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
372. See Robert J. Kutak, Chairman's Introduction to MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
(Proposed Final Draft 1981) (stating that following substantial public comment on client
confidentiality in the Discussion Draft, the Commission broadened the general rule and narrowed its
exceptions).
373. See id. ("The Discussion Draft ... called for mandatory pro bono legal service. This Final
Draft does not ... .
374. See Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, 107 A.B.A. ANN.
REP. 828, 833 (1982) (reprinting Proposed Final Draft as amended through June 30, 1982).
375. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of a
Professional Norm, 33 EMORY L.J. 271, 301 (1984) ("[I]t was ... decided to commence with the
more important and controversial Rules.").
376. Proceedings ofthe 1982 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 107 A.BA. ANN. REP.
603, 615 (1982).
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agreements. 377 A blizzard of amendments were made by delegates of state
bar associations as well as delegates representing the American College of
Trial Lawyers, the National Organization of Bar Counsel, the
International Association of Insurance Counsel, and the ABA's General
Practice Section. 378 At least some of the votes were tallied. For example,
Rule 1.5(a) required the fee to be "reasonable."'3 79  A proposed
amendment to alter the language to ban a "clearly excessive fee" was voted
down 126-177.38 0  Then, the House looked at proposed Rule 1.5(b),
which required the fee agreement be in writing.381 In a 210-92 vote,382
that requirement was deleted and substitute language that the fee
agreement be, "preferably in writing," was adopted. Proposed
amendments were numerous and overlapping. Even after the adoption of
Rule 1.5 by the House, Erwin N. Griswold, former Dean of Harvard Law
School and former Solicitor General, asked a question about the division
of fees among lawyers. 38 3 That resulted in a post-vote motion to amend
Rule 1.5, made while considering optional language on the floor, a
procedural failure and an exceedingly poor use of time. 3 84  The motion
failed.385
Geoffrey Hazard, the Kutak Commission's Reporter, then opened
discussion of Rule 1.6 regarding confidential communications. 38 6  He
immediately listed proposed and often contradictory amendments from
representatives of the Florida, Los Angeles, the District of Columbia, and
New York bars, the Criminal Justice Section, the Standing Committee on
Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, the American College of Trial
Lawyers, the International Association of Insurance Counsel, and the
377. See id. at 604 (stating the House of Delegates' choice to begin the meeting by discussing
Rule 1.5, which is about fee arrangements).
378. See id. at 605 (describing the process by which amendments were made and submitted).
379. See id. at 620 (describing the process by which delegates voted on the proposed
amendment to Rule 1.5(a), which .provided for a "reasonable" fee and enumerated eight factors to
consider in determining "reasonableness").
380. Id. at 619.
381. See id. at 618 (evaluating the proposal to Rule 1.5(b) that fee agreements must be in
writing).
382. Id. at 619.
383. See id. at 624 ("Erwin N. Griswold of the District of Columbia asked if a provision could
be added applying to cases where a lawyer employs another lawyer, noting that many cases he dealt
with came from other lawyers and that he might have been unethical in his practice depending on
how paragraph (b) was interpreted.").
384. Id.
385. Id
386. See Proceedings of the 1982 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 107 A.B.A. ANN.
REP. 603, 624 (1982) ("Debate then moved to proposals to amend Rule 1.6.").
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General Practice Section.387 These proposed amendments showed a deep
divide among lawyers about how far client confidences were to be kept,
even though this same issue had arisen on several other occasions in the
1970s. 388  The Commission anticipated this divide, noting in its 1982
report that "[n]o fundamental professional value assumed larger
importance in the Commission's work than that of client[-]lawyer
confidentiality."'38 9  Even so, disagreement arose over the scope of any
exceptions to client-lawyer confidentiality. 390 Disagreement existed over
more than specific exceptions to client confidences, and these differences
led one delegate to move to discharge the Kutak Commission. 39 1  This
was a direct challenge to the work of the Commission. It failed, but only
after vigorous debate. 3 92 The House decided to cool passions by deferring
further discussion to the Midyear Meeting in New Orleans. 393
The general and specific resistance of varying lawyer organizations to the
revised final draft, a draft that had been issued a year after the May 30,
1981, final draft, 394 indicated the extent of the dissensus within the
institutional legal profession. At the 1983 Annual Meeting, Robert
Meserve, acting as Chairman of the Commission after the death of Robert
Kutak, described the process of making the Model Rules as "the result of a
tremendous amount of compromise; a cross-fertilization of ideas between
many interested groups and individuals who had made welcome
387. See id at 624-25 (stating the long list of proposed amendments by state bar associations
and professional legal associations).
388. See Michael Ariens, "Playing Chicken" An Instant History ofthe Battle over Exceptions to
Client Confidences, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 239, 248-55 (2008) (discussing the National Student
Marketing fraud, the ABA's 1974 amendment to the Code regarding protection of client confidences
involving past or current fraud, and the Lake Pleasant Bodies case, in which two criminal defense
lawyers had their client direct them to the bodies of his murder victims, which they found and which
they kept secret until the first day of trial).
389. Report ofthe Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, 107 A.B.A. ANN. REP.
828, 829 (1982).
390. See id. ("No commentator on the Model Rules has suggested that the confidentiality
principle should have no exceptions. Disagreement arises over the scope of those exceptions.").
391. See Proceedings of the 1982 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 107 A.B.A. ANN.
REP. 603, 627-28 (1982) (explaining the motion of the Connecticut State Delegate to discharge the
Commission).
392. See id at 628 (reciting the various delegates' positions on the motion and its failure by
voice vote).
393. See id. at 628-29 ("[The] Chairman ... put before the House the motion to defer to the
Midyear Meeting. By voice vote, the motion passed.").
394. In its annual report to the ABA in 1981, Robert Kutak wrote for the Commission: "With
the publication earlier this summer of the Proposed Final Draft of Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, the work of this commission is essentially completed." Report of the Special Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards, 106 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 756, 756 (1981). He was too optimistic.
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suggestions which produced the report before the House."'3 95 Meserve, a
former ABA President, implicitly accepted the idea that the American legal
profession comprised interest groups with varied policy prescriptions. It
was no longer the uniform entity of the late 1960s.396
B. Crisis and the Model Rules
The January 9, 1983 issue of the New York Times published a lengthy
article of the unsavory story of O.P.M. Leasing Company.3 97 O.P.M.
Leasing (the initials apparently stood for "Other People's Money") had
failed after receiving about $200 million in loans based on fraudulent
leases. It was one of the largest frauds perpetrated in American history.398
On June, 12, 1980, Joseph L. Hutner, the senior partner at Singer Hutner,
the law firm that represented both O.P.M. Leasing and its owners, learned
of the fraud. 399 Singer Hutner received advice from a law firm it hired,
which concluded Singer Hutner could continue to represent O.P.M.
Leasing if Singer Hutner received assurances that fraudulent actions had
ended.40 0  In September, Singer Hutner voted to cease representing
O.P.M. Leasing, but did so gradually, upon the advice of Signer Hutner's
own outside counsel.40 1 O.P.M.'s fraud was not disclosed by Singer
Hutner, and the firm received $250,000 in fees owed and a $250,000
retainer from O.P.M. for any future work.4 0 2 Before the fraud was
disclosed, but after Singer Humer ended its representation, O.P.M.
395. See Proceedings of the 1983 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 108 A.B.A. ANN.
REP. 763, 766 (1983).
396. This belief existed from the beginning of the Commission's work. See SPECIAL COMM.
ON EVALUATION OF PROF'L STANDARDS, A.B.A., COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS JOURNALS, Sept. 1977-Aug. 1979, at Aspen, Colo., 4 (Sept. 29, 1977)
(on file at Yale Law School) ("[T]he profession is not the homogenous body it might once have been,
but has instead become a many-faceted thing.").
397. Stuart Taylor Jr., Ethics and the Law: A Case History, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 9, 1983, at
A31.
398. Id.
399. Id. Singer Hutner received 60% of its revenues from O.P.M. Leasing. See id. atA33 ("As
the computer leasing company grew, so did Singer Humer. [In] 1980 ... it collected more than $3.2
million in fees and expenses from O.P.M.-about 60 percent of its total income.").
400. See id. at A31 ("The advice offered by Putzel and McLaughlin in June and thereafter was
predicated on Singer Hutner's position that it did not 'know' of any ongoing fraud by O.P.M.").
Singer Hutner knew from O.P.M.'s in-house accountant that this was unlikely to happen. See id.
(reporting Singer Hutner stood idly by when O.P.M.'s accounting firm quit over suspicions of
fraud).
401. See id. ("Singer Hutner voted formally to resign as O.P.M.'s general counsel on Sept. 23
in a daylong series of meetings punctuated by expressions of concern about the effect of a possible
O.P.M. bankruptcy on the law firm's fees.").
402. Id.
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Leasing secured $15 million more in loans.40 3
The ABA's House of Delegates renewed its debate on the Model Rules
at. its February 1983 Midyear Meeting. 40 4 Despite having approved Rules
1.1 through 1.5 in 1982, the session began with a proposed amendment to
Rule 1.1.405 The run of amendments continued, with most failing, but
some, such as an amendment to Rule 1.2(d), gaining approval by a narrow
margin (158-144).4°6 Despite the cautionary tale of O.P.M. Leasing,4 7
Rule 1.6 was amended one final time, with even fewer exceptions to the
rule demanding client confidences be kept. 40 8
The amendments continued through five sessions of the House of
Delegates.4 0 9  For example, the House discussed proposed Rule 3.3,
which prohibited a lawyer from offering evidence the lawyer "knows to be
false," and which required a lawyer to "take reasonable remedial measures"
if the lawyer learned after the fact that she had offered false evidence.4 10
Reasonable remedial measures included the possibility of disclosing client
confidences. 4 '1 Delegates made six different amendments intended to
prohibit a lawyer from taking a remedial measure that involved disclosing
client perjury.4 12 Each amendment failed.4 13
The House completed its review of the Rules, but left for the Annual
Meeting approval of the Preamble, Scope, Terminology, and
Comments.4 14  In the interim, the interested bodies hashed out most
403. See id. (relating how Singer Hutner's silence ultimately allowed Goodman to use innocent
counsel to perpetrate more fraud).
404. See Proceedings of the 1983 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 108 A.B.A. ANN.
REP. 289, 291 (1983).
405. Id.
406. See id. at 291-95 (noting the failure of other proposed amendments made at the meeting,
but the passage of the amendment to Rule 1.2(d)).
407. See id. at 296-98 (listing three separate mentions of the scandal to allow exception to
rectify financial injury due to client fraud).
408. See id. at 298 (amending draft Rule 1.6(b) to include only two exceptions and adopting it
by a vote of 207-129).
409. See id. at 299-369 (recounting the continuation of proposed amendments to the Model
Rules through five sessions of the House of Delegates).
410. See id. at 333 (describing the proposed amendment to Rule 3.3, which would require a
lawyer to cure any false information that may have been unknowingly given).
411. See id. (noting the difficulty of amending Rule 3.3, without providing for disclosure of
privileged information).
412. See id. at 332-39 (outlining numerous amendments that attempted to address the issue of
non-disclosure of confidential information).
413. Id. at 33 4 -39.
414. Proceedings of the 1983 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 108 A.B.A. ANN. REP.
289, 291, 369 (1983); see also Proceedings of the 1983 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 108
A.B.A. ANN. REP. 763, 766 (1983) ("Action on the amendments to the blackletter Rules was
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major issues. 4 1 5 In just one session, the Model Rules were approved.4 16
Again, unlike approval of the Code, before the vote several delegates
explained their decision to reject the Model Rules. 4 1 7 Two recommended
disapproval for contrary reasons. The Florida Bar ordered its
representative to vote no on the ground that a lawyer was not required to
disclose a confidence from a client indicating "that he intended to commit
a crime." 4 1  The delegate of the State Bar of California, on the other
hand, urged a negative vote because "the blackletter Rules on the issue of
confidentiality did not go far enough."4 19
C. Unity Through Professionalism
A year after it adopted the Model Rules, the ABA created a Commission
on Professionalism to combat the possibility that "the Bar might be
moving away from the principles of professionalism and that it was so
perceived by the public." 420 That Commission issued a report in 1986
discussing the extensive changes to the legal profession since 1960. The
good news was that lawyers now took "the rules [of ethics] more seriously"
than before.421  The bad news was that lawyers "tended to look at nothing
but the rules." 4 22
The ABA and other law institutions began a crusade to re-instill
professionalism. 4 23  Although lawyers had written about ideals of
completed at the previous Midyear Meeting, and the House was asked at this meeting to consider the
Preamble, Scope, and Comments sections of the proposed model code.").
415. See id. at 766-67 (summarizing efforts since the Midyear Meeting to propose and
circulate amendments to the Model Rules).
416. Id. at 778.
417. See id. at 776-77 (describing the reasons that several delegates had for opposing the
Model Rules).
418. Id. at 776.
419. Id. at 777.
420. Report of the Commission on Professionalism to the Board of Governors and the House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association, 111 A.B.A. ANN. REP., no. 2, 1986, at 369, 373; see also
ABA Report of the Commission on Professionalism to the Board of Governors and the House of Delegates of
the American Bar Association, ".. In the Spirit of Public Service: 'A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer
Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986) (explaining the purpose behind the formation of the
Commission on Professionalism).
421. See Report of the Commission on Professionalism to the Board of Governors and the House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association, '...In the Spirit of Public Service.' A Blueprint for the
Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 259 (1986) (observing the transition from the
Canons to the Model Rules was paralleled by disciplinary enforcement, which resulted in lawyers
taking the rules more seriously).
422. Id. at 259.
423. See id. at 264 ("The Bar should place increasing emphasis on the role of lawyers as officers
of the court, or more broadly, as officers of the system of justice. Lawyers should exercise
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professionalism before the mid-1980s, 4 24 such articles were episodic and
rare enough that one, published in the 1969 ABA Journal, was titled
Professionalism-What Is It.42 5
In 1988, the ABA House of Delegates recommended to all state and
local bar associations that they adopt a lawyer's creed of
professionalism. 42 6 This creed, a secular statement of faith, was perceived
as applicable to all lawyers, and intended to remind lawyers that the
profession would not countenance "abuses" such as an "excessive zeal, a
'win at any cost' mentality, 'scorched earth' tactics and the apotheosizing
of 'playing hard ball."' 4 2 7  The Section on Professional Responsibility of
the Association of American Law Schools organized its annual program
that year around professionalism, 4 28 and the American Bar Foundation
sponsored a Conference on Professionalism. 4 29  Courts and bar
associations also focused on professionalism.
4 30
Within a half-decade, the professionalism crusade resulted in a flood of
books 43 ' and articles4 32 alternatively regretting or fearing the shift of law
independent judgment as to how to pursue legal matters. They have a duty to make the system of
justice work properly.").
424. See e.g., John G. Hervey, The Decline of Professionalism in the Law: An Exploration into
Some Causes, 3 N.Y. L. FORUM 349, 349-50 (1957) (commenting on the need for professionalism in
the legal industry).
425. Robert Ruppin, Professionalism-What Is It?, 55 A.B.A. J. 334 (1969).
426. See Report No. 2 of the Section of Tort and Insurance Practice, 113 A.B.A. ANN. REP., no. 2,
at 589, 589 (1988) ("W]e are proposing that the ABA recommend to all state and local bar
associations that they adopt a lawyers' 'Creed of Professionalism'...
427. Id.
428. Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV.
259, 261 n.4 (1995).
429. See ROBERT L. NELSON ET AL., LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES:
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION, at ix (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds.,
1992) (describing the ABA's September 1988 Conference on Professionalism).
430. THE TEXAS LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM (promulgated and
adopted by the Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of Criminal Appeals Nov. 7, 1989), reprinted
in Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo Litigators: Pitting Aggressive Tactics Against Legal Ethics, 17 PEPP. L.
REV. 637, 657-62 (1990); Special Comm. on Professionalism, Illinois St. B. Ass'n, The Bar, the
Bench and Professionalism in Illinois, 76 ILL. B.J. 441 (1988).
431. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION Is TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1996) (observing the impact of the
professionalism debate on American society); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER:
FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1995) (bemoaning the death of legal professionalism);
SOL M. LINOWITZ & MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994) (opining on the state of legal ethics).
432. See Marvin E. Aspen, The Search for Renewed Civility in Litigation, 28 VAL. U. L. REV.
513 (1994) (reporting on the state of professionalism in the 1990s); Nathan M. Crystal & Gregory
B. Adams, Introductory Remarks to the Conference on the Commercialization of the Legal Profession, 45
S.C. L. REV. 883 (1993) (recognizing the impact of greater commercialization on legal ethics); Peter
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from a profession to a business.43 3 Between 1986 and 2007, at least 140
local or state bar associations adopted some form of professionalism
creed.434
A second prong of the professionalism crusade was a 1983 amendment
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.435 The amendment was designed
in part to limit frivolous claims.4 36  Rule 11 was also intended "to deal
with the abuses that undermined civility and professionalism."'4 37 Instead
of reducing such abuses, Rule 11 "may have contributed to further
undermining the public's confidence in the profession as well."4 38 It did
so in part by creating complex satellite litigation investigating the propriety
of pleadings filed by lawyers. 439 One legal scholar very familiar with Rule
11 litigation concluded that an unintended consequence of the Rule was "a
deleterious effect on lawyer relations." 4 40
During the 1980s lawyers began using "ethics" as a weapon in litigation.
Efforts by advocates to disqualify opposing counsel on conflict of interest
grounds rose dramatically.44 1 In his 1986 legal ethics treatise Charles
Wolfram wrote, "The motion for a judicial order disqualifying a lawyer in
pending litigation because of conflict is a traditional remedy that has come
into prominence in recent years." 4 42  It appeared that motions to
disqualify opposing counsel on conflict of interest grounds were often used
A. Joy, What We Talk About When We Talk About Professionalism, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 987
(1993) (reviewing ROBERT L. NELSON, ET AL., LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES:
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (1992)).
433. See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, The Death of an Honorable Profession, 71 IND. L.J. 911, 911
(1996) ("The legal profession is dead or dying. It is rotting away into an occupation.").
434. See Donald E. Campbell, Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to Be Civil: Defining Civility
As an Obligation of Professional Responsibility, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 99, 101 n.17, 141-42 (2011)
(showing 140 bar associations adopted civility codes between 1987 and 2007).
435. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (amended 1983).
436. See Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 589, 597 (1998)
(showing sanctions imposed under Rule 11 were designed to raise the bar in filing federal suits).
437. Id. at 590.
438. Id.
439. See id. at 598 ("The 1983 Advisory Committee's invitation to use Rule 11 to attack
pleadings and motions triggered an avalanche of 'satellite litigation."').
440. See id. at 627-28 (citing a variety of studies showing most attorneys find Rule 11
decreased civility in the profession); see also Theodore C. Hirt, A Second Look at Amended Rule 11, 48
AM. U. L. REV. 1007, 1010 (1998) (describing some of the criticism of the effects of Rule 11 as
amended in 1983).
441. See Keith Swisher, The Practice and Theory of Lawyer Disqualification, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 71, 128 (2014) (citing one study showing a six-fold increase in motions to disqualify from
1970-1990).
442. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 7.1.7 at 329 (1986); see also Charles
W. Wolfram, Former-Client Conflicts, 10 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 677, 683-84 (1997) (citing cases
largely dating from the 1980s and early 1990s).
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as a tool to increase the other party's litigation costs rather than a tool to
rectify unethical behavior by opposing counsel.4 43
The deluge of Rule 11 motions to disqualify counsel was so great that
lawyers began writing about the baneful consequences of such litigation
tactics by the end of the 1980s. 11 Not only did this satellite litigation
increase costs, the greater regularity of lawyers attacking the "ethics" of
opposing counsel heightened the professionalism crisis.
445
These trends occurred during another decade in which the economics of
law practice boosted some lawyers, but which left other lawyers in more
economically strained circumstances. 446 As was true of the 1970s, lawyers
in large law firms generally did well. New associates in large law firms
were paid $83,000 by the late 1980s, and partners in such firms "often hit
the six- and seven-figure range." 44 7 The 1980s were also a great time for
high-end personal injury lawyers. Houston lawyer Joe Jamail won a $10.5
billion judgment for Pennzoil against Texaco in 1985, and received a
variously reported fee of $300-$420 million.4 48  An article in Forbes,
dated October 16, 1989, estimated the income of the highest-paid
personal injury and corporate lawyers in the United States.44 9  Of the
sixty-three personal injury lawyers listed, the lowest two-year estimated
income amount was $4 million, and of the seventy-one corporate lawyers
443. See Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 589, 599 (1998)
("[O]nce lawyers knew that the courts would grant sanctions motions [under Rule 11], and that the
likely sanction would be an award of costs and attorney's fees, lawyers had an incentive to bring
sanctions motions to achieve cost-shifting ... ").
444. See e.g., Gregory P. Joseph, The Trouble with Rule 11: Uncertain Standards and Mandatory
Sanctions, 73 A.B.A. J. 87, 88 (1987) (explaining the combination of mandatory sanctions and a
subjective test under Rule 11 as "explosive").
445. See Paul Marcotte, Reining in Rambo, 75 A.B.A. J. 18, 43 (1989) (noting the growing
frustration among Texas judges regarding abusive litigation tactics); Thomas J. Paprocki, Ethics in the
Everyday Practice of Law, 35 CATH. LAW. 169, 172 (1991) (concluding restoration of civility is
direcly tied to adherence to ethical practice); Thomas M. Reavely, Rambo Litigators: Pitting Aggressive
Tactics Against Legal Ethics, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 637, 637 (1989) (explaining why the "Rambo" attitude
should be discouraged in the legal profession); Robert N. Sayler, Rambo Litigation: Why Hardball
Tactics Don't Work, 74 A.BA. J. 79, 79 (1988) (refuting the notion that hardball lawyering is
effective trial advocacy); see also Bradley W. Foster, Comment, Playing Hardball in Federal Court;
Judicial Attempts to Referee Unsportsmanlike Conduct, 55 J. AIR L. & COM. 223, 223-24 (1989)
(discussing the increasing trend of hardball trial tactics).
446. See E. Douglass Williams & Richard H. Sander, Choosing to Become a Lawyer 25 (working
paper Sept. 15, 2013) (copy on file with author) (noting in Table 3 increase in median income for
full-time white male lawyers from $91,386 in 1980 to $113,681 in 1990 in constant 2007 dollars, an
increase of 24%). See id. (noting similar increases in lawyer income in 1980s in Tables 4 and 5).
447. Stephanie B. Goldberg, Then and Now: 75 Years of Change, 76 A.B.A. J. 56, 58 (1990).
448. MICHAEL ARIENS, LONE STAR LAW: A LEGAL HISTORY OF TEXAS 274 (2011).
449. The Best Paid Trial Lawyers, FORBES, Oct. 16, 1989, at 204.
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listed, the lowest annual income was "at least $1 million."4 50 In contrast,
a 1984 ABA survey of 3,000 lawyers found "77 percent earned less than
$75,000.-45 1 One dramatic expression of this difference was the growing
income difference between sole practitioners and law firm partners
between 1961 and 1985. Law firm partners earned an average of about
2.3 times the income of a sole practitioner in 1961.452 By 1986, partners
earned over three times the income of a sole practitioner.4 53 Additionally,
the ratio of lawyer median income to lawyer mean income showed a rising
inequality in lawyer incomes.4 54
The professionalism crusade was intended to unify what had become an
atomized profession. All lawyers, no matter their status, were called to act
with "personal dignity, integrity, and independence. '" 4 55 And all lawyers
were charged with pledging fealty to the ideal of professionalism "for no
other reason than it is right."456 However, neither the Model Rules nor
the economic times provided the possibility of entering another golden
age. The professionalism crusade was undertaken with the implicit
understanding that the Model Rules and its emphasis on a law of lawyering
could not make (or keep) lawyers professional. It was a crusade that
allowed the profession's past to serve as a reminder of our better angels, but
was insufficient to direct lawyers toward a better future.
V. CONCLUSION
A golden age is golden because we decide to compare it favorably to its
ostensible competitors. Its flaws are shunted to the background, and
confirmation bias leads us to the see the best in one bygone age and the
worst in others. More likely, it is always the best of times and the worst of
times.
450. Id. at 207, 219.
451. Stephanie B. Goldberg, Then andNow: 75 Years of Change, 76 A.B.A.J. 56, 58 (1990).
452. Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams, Why Are There So Many Lawyers? Perspectives
on a Turbulent Market, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 431, 450 tbl.11 (1989); see also E. Douglass
Williams & Richard H. Sander, Choosing to Become a Lawyer 20 (working paper Sept. 15, 2013)
(copy on file with author) (noting "pattern of rising inequality" in lawyer income distribution from
1960-2010).
453. Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams, Why Are There So Many Lawryers? Perspectives
on a Turbulent Market, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 431, 450 tbl.1 1(1989).
454. See id. at 449 (explaining the trend in income disparity in the legal profession).
455. THE TEXAS LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM (promulgated and
adopted by the Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of Criminal Appeals Nov. 7, 1989), reprinted
in Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo Litigators: Pitting Aggressive Tactics Against Legal Ethics, 17 PEPP. L.
REV. 637, 659 (1990).
456. Id.
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The adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility confirmed in
those so inclined the existence of a golden age. The willingness of 350,000
or so lawyers4 57 implicitly to delegate the task of crafting a code of ethics
to fewer than a dozen indicated some type of consensus about what it
meant to be an American lawyer. Nevertheless, tensions concerning the
materials composing the profession's ideals had already surfaced. Those
tensions were almost palpable by the mid-1970s, and disparate subgroups
of lawyers agreed that the Code needed to be replaced. What those
subgroups had not decided was what ethos would be reflected by the
Code's successor. The Kutak Commission's answer to that question
simply raised more questions.
The economics of the legal services market had undergone a
transformation in the 1970s, which continued in the 1980s. Legal ethics
scholar Stephen Gillers was quoted in a January 1990 ABA Journal article
on the consequences of this transformation: "I've noticed profound and
disquieting changes among practitioners-a feeling of anxiety and angst
because of a loss of control."
4 58
The anxiety lawyers felt was not unique to the legal profession. The
United States after 1970 was awash in a sea of anxious workers and
unemployed, parents and children, educators and students, and politicians
and citizens.4 5 9  The United States had fractured,4 6 0 and lawyers and
others carried with them an incomplete map of the present, and a wariness
of the future.
457. See THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE U.S. LEGAL
PROFESSION IN THE 1980S, at 4 (Barbara A. Curran et al. eds., 1985); see also RICHARD L. ABEL,
AMERICAN LAWYERS 280 (1989).
458. Stephanie B. Goldberg, Then andNow: 75 Years of Change, 76 A.B.A. J. 56, 58 (1990).
459. See Edwin R. Render, How Would Today's Employees Fare in a Recession?, 4 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 37, 39-40 (2001) (recounting the economic conditions present in the 1970s in the
United States).
460. See generally DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE (paperback ed., 2012) (describing
the economy and society of 1960s and 1970s America).
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